

# THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

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## Notes of Recent Exposition.

It may be taken as an evidence of the fullness of the truth as it is in Jesus that the Church's presentation of it varies from time to time, with the emphasis laid now on this aspect, now on that, as if in a continually renewed endeavour to do justice to its all-round completeness.

In recent times much prominence has been given to the social gospel. The conception of the Kingdom of God has been predominant. It has been taken for granted that the social gospel was the original gospel subsequently obscured by doctrinal and churchly tradition. 'Christians had their authority for a social task in the teachings of Jesus, and they approached the future with a clear sense of direction and with a faith that they could be co-workers with God in building his kingdom in this world.'

To-day there is a perceptible movement away from this position. A doubt has arisen, and is making itself felt strongly, as to whether the social gospel is the principal thing and whether it sufficiently interprets the concept of the Kingdom of God. Where before there was clarity and confidence there is now a manifest doubt and hesitation. 'It seems as though the leaders of Christian thought had just succeeded in waking up large sections of the church to its social task and then themselves had grown uncertain and cold concerning that task.'

The question is raised as to the relation of the  
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gospel to modern society. Can we really find in the simple teaching of Jesus a sufficient guide for the right organizing of our complex social system? This topic is treated in an interesting article on 'The Relevance of the Ethic of Jesus for Modern Society,' by Mr John C. BENNETT of Auburn Theological Seminary. It is published in the current number of *Religion in Life*, an American Christian Quarterly which is always fresh and vital.

First of all we must be clear as to the content of the ethic of Jesus before we consider its applications. Briefly summarized, the ethic of Jesus is rooted in His religion. God is the pattern for ethical life, and the worth of human persons is known from God's love for them. The moral problem is primarily a problem of the inner life. Out of the heart of man proceed all those evils that vex humanity. Love is the supreme demand, love without barriers, love absolute not only in its inclusiveness but also in its intensity, love to the utmost point of forgiveness and self-sacrifice. At the same time a balance is preserved between love and an aggressive dealing with evil. 'There is what John Mackay calls the "Christ of the whip." He came to cast fire on the earth, to bring not peace but a sword. His denunciations of the Pharisees and his cleansing of the temple, instead of being blemishes to be explained away, reveal the balance of his character.' Further in His scale of values, while first place is given to the highest spiritual good, room is made for the primary needs of bread and health. 'He saw the



evil of wealth and the evil of hunger. He avoided the extremes of ascetic religion and of this-worldly religion, of Hinduism and of Communism.' And, withal, He laid stress on the moral and religious importance of humility. 'One should be as receptive as a child. The poor, the meek, those who know that they are sinners—they are the folk who are most fit for the Kingdom of God.'

Now in trying to apply this ethic to modern conditions the first difficulty we encounter lies in the difference between our age and the age of Jesus. This difference has been stressed. Jesus, it is said, had no knowledge of science and art, no notion of natural law, no conception of the mastery over Nature which man was to attain and by means of which he would profoundly alter the conditions of human life. 'Those who speak in this way are trying to say one thing which needs to be said. They are protesting against the assumption of much conventional Christianity that Christ is "all sufficient" for salvation, against the neglect of specific modern methods for dealing with the soul and society.'

The fallacy underlying this argument lies in the assumption that the things that have changed are more important than the things that endure. Much of the talk about the revolutionary changes in human life which this age of ours has brought to pass is highly exaggerated. After all, these changes when they are examined are found to be very superficial. 'There has been no important change in human nature, in our basic needs and emotions, in the effect of suffering and sin and death upon us, in our essential dependence upon an apparently indifferent nature, in what we most admire, in our experience of God. The permanence of great literature, the permanence of Plato suggests that there should be no *a priori* difficulty about the permanence of Jesus.'

A more serious difficulty lies in the apocalyptic elements in the teaching of Jesus. These have been taken to mean that 'Jesus had no ethic which is relevant to the task of changing society gradually, by human effort,' but only an ethic suitable for the short period before the coming of the Kingdom.

But it is evident that while Jesus did think in terms of apocalyptic He was not obsessed by it. He put new moral and religious content into it. He avoided an immoral fatalism by His emphasis on repentance as the condition of entrance into the Kingdom, and He was not blind to the values of common life: It was of the essence of His sane apocalyptic that He held the balance even between the eternal and the temporal, and looked at human life from the only true standpoint. 'It was one of the results of his apocalyptic form of thought that the ethic of Jesus retained an absoluteness which might not have been possible if he had been interested in the next steps for the Jews in Palestine in the first century instead of the conditions for entrance into the eternal kingdom of God. As it is he has set forth an ethic which is not fully applicable to any age but which is the regulative ideal for every age.'

This raises the question of whether the ethic of Jesus can be applied in any social system without compromise. Glib talk about applying His principles is unreal, for no social order in this present world is or ever will be in the full sense Christian. Of course, 'for the individual Christian, so far as his inner life is concerned, the ideal of absolute love is not so remote from the possibility of realisation that we need to raise the question of its relevance.' But social conditions place limits on the full expression of the Christian ideal. 'We are involved in the behavior of the nation but we cannot reasonably expect that the policy of the nation will rise above enlightened self-interest. Indeed, at present we should have reason to be thankful if nations were to rise to that level. We are involved in the practices which make possible our economic privileges, and the only real escape from responsibility for them is to ally ourselves with those who from motives and by methods which are ethically mixed are seeking to overthrow the economic order by which we profit. In either case we are forced to compromise.'

Are we, then, shut up to a double standard of morality, a Christian standard for the individual, and a sub-Christian standard for the group? Here the ethic of Jesus can help us in two ways.



It provides a norm by which the present social order is to be judged. There must ever be a sense of tension between the Christian ideal and the best possible social good open to us. 'That tension gives us the correct perspective from which to see ourselves and society, and it is a necessary spur to keep us at the task of raising the level of social possibility. To relax that tension is to run the risk of identifying what is at present inevitable with what is divinely ordained. We must be wary about calling any human institution a "schöpfungsordnung" (an order of creation), for man has had too large a part in the creation of such institutions to identify them, no matter how stubbornly resistant to human wills, with the will of God.'

Next there is the encouragement to do something, in the assurance that the next-best-thing-to-be-done has behind it the authority of the ideal. There is no situation so bad that there is not some best thing to be done in it, and our sense of shortcoming should be based, not upon the distance between the next-best-thing-to-be-done and the absolute ideal, but rather upon our weakness and failure in doing it, or upon careless or biased choice among the possibilities which are open to us. 'The worst danger which confronts those who emphasize the absoluteness of the ethic of Jesus is that they will reduce all possibilities to the same level as equally infected with sin. Capitalism, fascism, socialism, communism would be equally outside the circle of the concern of the Christian as a Christian. This tendency is characteristic of theology which is under Barthian influence. It is good to see that Brunner carefully avoids it. He says that the Christian must seek the better and the more just even though it is not fully Christian. As he puts it, though all economic and political possibilities are relative they are not equal. If we combine that warning with the conception of vocation which is central in Brunner's ethical thought it can be said that the vocation of the Christian is to do the next-best-thing though it fall short of the absolute ideal. The tension between that next-best-thing and the Christian ideal will keep him in a state of restlessness which at every stage of the process will put the burden of proof on all compromises, and which will constrain him

to leave nothing undone to create new levels of possibility. . . . If Christian love means anything it will constrain us to work for radical social change and it will not allow us to be turned aside by sophisticated interpretations of Jesus, by theories of determinism, by perfectionist scruples, or by the opiate of a pessimistic eschatology.'

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The main feature of Canon Lindsay DEWAR's *Man and God*, reviewed in another column, is its emphasis upon the empirical argument for belief in God, which is the argument from religious experience. This, he says, is the most fundamental argument, because apart from it we cannot be led to God at all. As Clement Webb says: 'Only in and through religious experience have we any knowledge of God. What are called arguments for the existence of God will never prove to those who lack such experience the existence of God, but only at most the need of assuming, in order to account for our experiences other than religious, a Designing Mind, or a Necessary Being, or an Absolute Reality.'

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Schleiermacher recognized the primacy of religious experience, and this has made him such an important influence in the history of religion. But he does not mean by religious experience the immediate apprehension of God as adorable. The feeling of absolute dependence, which is for Schleiermacher the essence of religion, is universally bound up with self-consciousness, but is independent of all specific experience. It is continuously present and remains self-identical while all other states of mind are changing. Clearly there is here no immediate apprehension of God. On the contrary, God is known only by inference from the feeling of absolute dependence.

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In the 'Discourses' Schleiermacher appears to write in a somewhat different strain. His language there appears to indicate that religious experience means an immediate as distinct from an inferred apprehension of God, such as it means in 'The Christian Faith.' But he is no closer to the position from which Canon DEWAR argues, that in religious experience God is immediately apprehended. For



in the 'Discourses' he gives religion a definitely pantheistic turn.

In Schleiermacher there is no thinking about God, whether, as in his later work, we make God an inference, or whether we adopt his earlier pantheistic standpoint. In either case we are concerned simply with states of mind. This is in complete antithesis to the views of religion which Canon DEWAR suggests. For him God is the centre of all religious experience. The experiencer is on the circumference. With Schleiermacher, on the other hand, the experiencer is in the centre and God is on the circumference.

The argument from religious experience is, then, not to be confounded with the teaching of Schleiermacher, whose advocacy of the importance of religious experience has led to serious misunderstandings. His is the ego-centric viewpoint, and the only way to get away from that viewpoint is to recognize the immediacy of the apprehension of God, which is the truth underlying the Ontological Argument. For the Ontological Argument can only be rightly appreciated as an attempt to vindicate the validity of religious experience. But we shall not follow Canon DEWAR's exposition further.

Enough has been said to show why it is that the Barthian theologians think that theology went wrong with Schleiermacher. It became a monologue in which only man was the speaker. It should be a dialogue, in which man is the listener and God the Speaker.

A notably interesting and important statement has been issued by Mr. J. H. OLDHAM in the shape of a pamphlet, *Church, Community and State: A World Issue* (S.C.M.; 1s. net). Mr. OLDHAM is nearly as well known internationally as Dr. Mott, and his words are always well-weighted and pointed. His present deliverance has to do with the World Conference which is being called for 1937 by the Universal Christian Council, and is by way of

preparation for it. But the matter of his pamphlet is of urgent concern to us all in 1935.

In thoughtful minds, both Christian and non-Christian, there is a widespread and deep sense that we stand to-day at one of the great turning-points in human history, comparable in significance to that in which the Middle Ages gave birth to the modern world. The ideas which have given character and shape to modern Western civilization are in the melting-pot, and what the new will be no man can say. All that we can do is to open our minds to the momentous happenings of our own time and try to understand their meaning in the light of Christian faith.

One of the most striking changes in the past hundred years has been a prodigious expansion in the functions of the State. One region of life after another has been brought under its control. Mr. OLDHAM gives a long list of these. But the fact is familiar. And what is equally plain is that this State-activity has brought to the community many and large social benefits. Organization may be the means to a larger freedom, as the strict control of the motor traffic has shown.

None the less it would be sheer blindness to ignore the fact that in this extension of State control there are grave dangers. And the menace becomes serious in proportion as the State advances 'totalitarian' claims, i.e. in so far as it claims to dominate, control, and direct the whole life of the community and of its individual members. Such totalitarian claims are being made to-day in Russia, Italy, Germany, and even in Mexico and Turkey. The totalitarian State is one which lays claim to man in the totality of his being; which declares its own authority to be the source of all authority; which refuses to recognize the independence in their own sphere of religion, culture, education, and the family; which seeks to impose on all its citizens a particular philosophy of life; and which sets out to create by means of all the agencies of public information and education a particular type of man in accordance with its own understanding of the meaning and end of man's existence.



Underlying these claims are certain beliefs regarding the nature and destiny of man. In so far as these are incompatible with the Christian understanding of the meaning and purpose of man's existence, the Church must inevitably be involved in a life and death struggle for its existence. Any attempt to use the supreme authority of the State and all the agencies at its command to impose on the whole community a philosophy of life and a pattern of living which are wholly, or in important respects, contrary to the Christian understanding of the real meaning of life constitutes a definite menace to Christianity.

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An obvious illustration is Russia. The aim of Communism is to establish an integral culture on the basis of an integral philosophy of life. No quarter, therefore, must be given to religion. 'We reject religion,' it has been officially proclaimed, 'in order to clear and prepare the way for injecting into the consciousness of the toilers the basic principles of Marxian science. With us exposure is no end in itself; it is only one of the means of purging the minds of the toilers of false mystic views of life by grafting thereon the scientific materialist conception of the world, of man and of human society.'

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In the Italian Fascist State religion is both respected and protected. But here also it is clearly affirmed that 'Fascism conceives of the State as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the State.' That there can be spheres of life independent of the State is emphatically denied. The Fascist conviction is expressed in the watchword, 'Nothing against the State; nothing outside the State; everything for the State.' There may be a concordat with religion, but between an integral nationalism which claims absolute authority and seeks to form its citizens in accordance with its own understanding of life and those whose ultimate loyalty is to God and His demands, there can be no abiding reconciliation.

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Germany seems equally favourable towards Christianity. But in Germany the determining

factor is the resolute and passionate will to create an integral national life, expressing the spirit and embodying the values of the German racial and national soul. The source of everything is the ultimate influence of soil and blood and communal solidarity. The task of the present, says one of Germany's leading nationalists, Rosenberg, is 'to awaken the racial soul to life, to recognize that it is the supreme value, and to assign to other values their organic place under its sovereignty—in State, art, and religion, since the race-bound soul of the community is the measure of all our thoughts, voluntary aspirations, and actions.' Every other interest, including religion, must be subordinated to the primacy of the political aim.

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The issue this raises is obvious. The Church has always been in conflict with the secularized world, but a new factor has been introduced into the struggle in our day, changing its character in ways that we have hardly begun to appreciate. The new factor is the closer organization of society resulting from the enormous advances in science and technical invention. The members of a modern community find themselves more and more closely bound together in a common life and subjected as never before to the continuous pressure of a common culture interpreted by their rulers, writers, and educators. The crucial issue is whether this common life and common culture will be inspired by Christian or pagan conceptions of the meaning and purpose of human life. In a community consciously committed to a pagan view, and most of all where the State has adopted a totalitarian policy, the Christian witness of the Church can be borne only at the cost of suffering and martyrdom. Once again the Christian Church throughout the world confronts a situation resembling in many respects that in which in the early centuries it stood face to face with the pagan might of the Roman Empire.

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This is the motive that has led to the calling of a great World Conference of the Christian churches. It is increasingly clear that among the questions that concern the Christian Church at the present time none is more central and fundamental than



that of its relations with the modern State and the secularized society from which the State derives its character. This conviction has received powerful reinforcement from the course of events in the German Evangelical Church. It is this question to which the World Conference will devote its

consideration. In the latter part of his pamphlet Mr. OLDHAM sketches the kind of detailed problems that are rooted in the central issue, and the task to which, in his view, the Church must address itself. The whole pamphlet should be carefully studied.

## Things most certainly Believed.

### VI.

BY PROFESSOR H. R. MACKINTOSH, D.PHIL., D.D., EDINBURGH.

In the last resort, I suppose, there is only one thing I believe, namely, that God is of such and such a character. Or at all events there is only one Reality to which I can give that unique and unmitigated trust which deserves the great name of 'religious faith'—God, the Creator, Reconciler, and Redeemer. This probably is obvious, but it is worth while repeating with the modest intention of underlining the truth, frequently overlooked, that the gospel, to believe which makes one a Christian, is not just a number of things, no one can tell how many, but a definite declaration of a single truth, and that a truth about God. Theology is the doctrine of God. No doubt it sets forth other derivative aspects of truth as well; but ultimately all it has to say about man or sin or pardon or immortality is known to be true because, above and behind all else, we are sure of God.

Once this is understood, there is no difficulty in going on to other articles in my personal creed, which, if they really are implied in what by faith I know about God, will share the certainty I have of Him. They will be things which He has made sure to me in the ways He uses to bring conviction to the human mind. What these ways are we need not pause to debate here. Suffice it to say that He who reveals Himself to me as being of a certain character, and as in that character claiming me for Himself, thereby implicitly brings home to me certain other truths about myself, my neighbour, the world that my neighbour and I inhabit, our common prospects, our reciprocal duties. The single fundamental doctrine of God—which, with all its genuine singleness, may be complex enough—rays out an absolute light on all other facts, so far as they concern my personal relationship to Him.

If He has spoken to me, if I have heard His sovereign Word of love and judgment, then by that very circumstance I have become aware in principle of what I am to believe also concerning man and the world. To become a British citizen implies for a foreigner much more than is expressly stated in his papers of naturalization; to have been brought to belief in God involves various other true beliefs in addition, all consequent upon, and inseparable from, the basic and initial certainty concerning God. No doubt I shall need time to spell out these particular implications, and even by the end I shall only be fully conscious of a few. But once I discover them, I shall have the insight that they were wrapped up in the truth about God from the start. I have not invented them; under God's teaching they have dawned upon me.

This initial or all-embracing belief about God, quite clearly, is not a belief reached by the pathway of scientific demonstration. And more, it is not enough to say, however confidently, that it is none the worse for that. The point rather is that to try for scientific proof of my faith in God would show only too clearly that I had no real understanding of what believing in God means. A Cambridge philosopher, writing to a friend about Tennyson's *In Memoriam*, observes: 'I don't think it's any good appealing, as he is rather fond of doing, to the heart on questions of truth. After all, there is only one way of getting at the truth and that is by proving it. All that talk about the heart only comes to saying, "It must be true because we want it to be." Which is both false and rather cowardly.' This has a conclusive sound until we think it over. The philosopher in question, in spite of his brave words, would have been hard put to it to prove—in



the rigid logical sense he attached to proof—that his dearest friend loved him back, or that if he did, he would still continue to love him next day. He trusted his heart, his immediate intuitions, as all loving people do in the circumstances, and did so with the consciousness that in that type of situation this is the only right way by which truth can be apprehended. To ask for scientific proof in a question of intimate personal relationships is—to adapt the figure of William Law—like appealing to the eye to smell. In like manner, we err even philosophically when we demand scientific proof that God is to be trusted and obeyed. That is a form of approach unsuited to the object of faith. In any case it would lead us nowhere; which is just one aspect of the meaning latent in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Not scientific demonstration, but only God's own power working inwardly can persuade us to cast ourselves on God.

With these preliminary remarks, I will set down one or two of the truths which to me personally are beyond doubt. I don't mean that I have never doubted them in weaker hours, but only that it subsequently became clear that the impulse to doubt sprang from something wrong in myself, not in them. Faith in us is not invariably at its best, any more than it was in the disciples; yet the foundation of the Lord standeth sure. And our real creed consists, not in what we follow others in saying we believe, but in what in the moments given us of clearest religious insight, we cannot help believing.

My first certainty is that there is an absolute difference between choosing good and choosing evil. No doubt it is true that, in this mixed world, good and evil as they present themselves to the observer shade off imperceptibly into each other. Rarely are the issues set out starkly in black and white. We may find it uncommonly hard, on occasion, to say where good ends and evil begins; were it otherwise, we should have been spared interminable discussions about the apparent conflict of duties. But that is not the point. The point is that, assuming that we know which of two alternatives is right for us, and which is wrong, there is an infinite gulf fixed between electing to do the first and electing to do the second. The one is life, the other death. Further, about this momentous choice two things impress me as utterly sure and clear. The first is that the decision has been set before me by God. He has called me to this decision, for the voice heard in enlightened conscience is His voice. The second is that my relationship to God will be gravely affected by the manner in which I deal with the choice with

which He has confronted me. It matters infinitely for my standing before Him whether or not I choose the good and refuse the evil. In the felt majesty and pressure of the moral law, God Himself is addressing me.

Again, it is indubitable to me that God speaks directly to our heart in the Bible. As we read it, it is with a sense that the Bible is not as other books, and that to treat it as if it belonged to a class of writings in which it was merely the most conspicuous member is definitely impious. Jesus' recorded words of promise or command bring with them the certainty that He is saying these things to us now, and ultimately that God is saying them to us through Him. The witness of prophets and apostles to God's judgment and mercy is directed straight to us to-day, and when it invades our life as an urgent reality we have to exert force to thrust it aside. The voice that calls us, as the Bible lies open, is not one that rises up within, as native to the human soul, as the supposedly objective but really subjectively projected guarantee of wish-fulfillments; it is much too stern and much too full of an unimaginable grace for that. Something tells me that if I am humble enough to listen, I shall learn God's will, that He has a message for me, and that my response thereto touches the ultimate issues of life and death. What He is saying I cannot take in of myself, any more than a colour-blind man can appreciate the beauty of a Rembrandt; but from His Word, as it lays hold upon my inmost being, I gather assurance that He Himself will aid me to understand. The experimental proof that this wonderful thing does occur—that, blind as I am, a higher agency enables me to see—is afforded by the plain fact, familiar to all believers, that by submission of heart and mind to His Word addressed to them they are actually brought into fellowship with God. There is no doctrine more firmly or more deeply embedded in the soil of Christian experience than the doctrine of 'the inward testimony of the Holy Spirit.'

Once more, when God speaks to us in His Word, and we are made capable of so listening as to understand, the result is a new and dreadful view of ourselves as radically evil. To stand before the Holy One is to be convinced of sin in a manner that places our condition beyond the possibility of dispute. If people tell me that they can think of God and of themselves at the same time without any painful sense of incongruity, or without the suspicion stealing over them that they badly need to be changed, I cannot show them they are wrong, or prevent their further indulgence in self-satis-



faction ; but I can add my witness to that of all those who have met Christ that to see Him clearly is to be filled with penitential shame. In short, one thing which in God's realized presence becomes as sure as the sun in the firmament is that we are sinners. How sinful we are may be debated, and actually has been debated at great length ; the simple truth, as it forces itself on my own mind, is that apart from God we men are wholly evil ; though, in His infinite compassion, He is never wholly apart from us. Not only does this sense of immeasurable unworthiness register itself unmistakably in the mind, but it carries along with it the utterly clear-eyed conviction that I need to be forgiven, that forgiveness, if it be imparted, will be the bestowal of pure Divine grace, and that I cannot even of my own good impulse turn from my sin to God. The flash of revelation which lights up the soul on whom the Holiness of God has broken, discloses the fact that man's state is one of ruin, and that no change can be hoped for except as the Holy One acts in sovereign mercy. I am inclined to think that all Christians really believe this in their secret heart. They may use Pelagian language freely enough when they are talking about other people, or to them ; but the words they employ in their own agonizing penitential prayers are very different. What is more, they know themselves much better than they know any of their neighbours. As Barth with a trumpet voice has reminded this generation, all real religious thinking applies truth to oneself, and beliefs which are not given this intensely personal reference are apt to be the beliefs merely of the spectator, that is the outsider. The true doctrine of sin, accordingly, is what we are obliged to affirm concerning ourselves, not our more or less external opinions about our neighbours. It was a great saint who uttered the words : 'Sinners, of whom I am chief.' If true of him, these words all the more are true of the rest of us. If certainty is possible for man, then, I am certain of my own deep and inexcusable sinfulness, luminously disclosed by the holiness manifest in Christ.

Further, I cannot doubt that God is personally present in Christ, or that this specific Divine presence, to redeeming issues, is confined uniquely to Him. Here we are concerned neither with the avenues of experience or reflection by which this certitude is approached, or with the particular formulations of a doctrinal character in which it has to be registered. We are concerned only with the certitude itself. I cannot divest myself of the complete and awe-inspiring assurance that when I

encounter Christ I am in the presence of the Eternal. Unless we deny every trace of veracity to the Gospels, it is definitely and truly affirmed there that during Jesus' earthly life—as when Peter fell down at His knees in penitence—He so affected some of His neighbours that they felt Him to be the Representative of God. They knew, without reasoning, that His condemnation and His pardon were the condemnation and pardon of the Father. Doubtless their recognition of Him in this character was faltering at the outset ; for a brief interval it was overthrown by the shock of the Crucifixion ; but the Resurrection established it for ever. So far as I can judge from observation, and from their own most credible testimony, Christ is affecting men in similar fashion to this very hour and bringing men to respond to Him with the same unreserved self-abandonment as the disciples showed. He is dealing with them in ways which they have no choice but to acknowledge as God's ways. For me it is clear, as clear as any truth capable of statement, that to distrust Christ's word of promise is to distrust God's own promise, and that to be disobedient to Christ is to disobey God Himself. I am no longer at liberty to think otherwise.

Still further, the consciousness of sin makes plain and urgent the necessity for pardon ; and this I am certain is assured to us only in Christ, and distinctively in His death. To employ a word which happily is being brought back into religion and theology, Christ is the one Mediator between God and man. He alone can take the sinful by the hand and lead them in with Himself to the presence of utter Holiness. It is not merely that apart from Him we should not dare to enter there with confidence ; we could not so enter. As moral beings we are so made that, once we perceive and bow before Christ's perfect goodness, recognizing that in Him God is drawing near us, we are unable to present ourselves to the Father except as Christ becomes responsible for us. On the other hand, the very Christ who humbles us to the ground by His holiness, by His love lifts us up and fills us with a hope that never makes ashamed. From His Cross, where He takes on Himself our iniquities, He pronounces words that the consciously sinful love to hear : 'Son, thy sins are forgiven thee.' They are so spoken that we are persuaded of their perfect truth. Those who ignore the Mediatorship of Christ, or relegate it to an unimportant place in the round of truth, appear to me, therefore, to do so because they antecedently ignore or minimize the acute problem of sin which Christ signalizes and then



solves. We can dispense with the Mediator only as we camouflage the hopeless load from which we have need to be delivered.

Again, in the light of Christ I cannot doubt that I am my brother's keeper. Nothing can be so clear as that the distinctive boon or bestowal offered in Christ can neither be received nor retained in isolation, and that if, to use a phrase of Luther's, we try 'to enjoy God all by ourselves in a corner,' it slips inevitably from our grasp. The certainty that we are the forgiven children of God can flourish nowhere except in an atmosphere of brotherhood, warmed by the conviction that God can have no blessing for us which is not meant for every member of the family. The brotherly impulse of itself will not generate such a certainty, but if desire for brotherhood dies, the certainty I am speaking of dies along with it. Hence we may know by immediate intuition—which is the human aspect of the Spirit's witness—that no Christianity deserves the name which is not a corporate possession, and that religion which communicates no abiding impetus towards social betterment is, not accidentally but intrinsically, hostile to the gospel. We alter the quality of God's good news when we fail to proclaim it as calling likewise for love and justice to our neighbour. For we cannot have God without having our brother also.

Finally, the character of God revealed in Jesus

makes immortality certain. Not even by making a great effort can we envisage God as One who pardons our evil and thereby takes us to be in fellowship with Him, and then combine with this the desolating suspicion that at the last He will leave us in the dust. Survival, indeed, is not by itself a religious or Christian thought at all; considered abstractly it may be no more than one element in what may be called the 'natural history' of the unseen world; it only becomes religious when it is put in relation to God in whose hand are the issues of life. All the assurance we need—all the assurance possible or conceivable—respecting a blessed life after death lies in the words: 'Because I live, ye shall live also,' and 'He is not the God of the dead but of the living.' No cumulative evidence gathered from the experiments of psychical research will silence the doubts of mortal men as they contemplate an open grave, or assure them that the kind of survival these experiments indicate is necessarily worth having. For myself I seem to hear a deeper note, and one that satisfies, in the lines of a simple old Moravian hymn:

And when I'm to die,  
Receive me, I'll cry;  
For Jesus hath loved me, I cannot tell why.  
But this I do find,  
We two are so joined,  
He'll not be in glory, and leave me behind.

## Literature.

### H. G. WOOD'S HULSEAN LECTURES.

IN appointing Mr. H. G. Wood Hulsean Lecturer for 1933-34 the Trustees of the Lectureship made a notable innovation. While the appointment of a Free Churchman was not novel—one had previously held office—Mr. Wood is the first layman to be so trusted. Of course there are few laymen so well equipped for such a task as Mr. Wood. We have known laymen who were quite competent in some one branch of theological study; we doubt if any but Mr. Wood is so able to teach on nearly all the subjects that go to make a whole theological curriculum. If the Society of Friends had Orders, Mr. Wood, we may suppose, might be Archbishop. A wide public is already familiar with the very high standard of his published work, marked as it

is by meticulous scholarship, sound judgment, and delightfully limpid style. All those qualities are manifest in the published form of his Hulsean Lectures, *Christianity and the Nature of History* (Cambridge University Press; 6s. net).

There are five lectures, each dealing with a very important topic: the Christian emphasis on historical happenings, is it not in line with the nature of history as the modern historian conceives it?; the place played by great men in history; does not the coming of Jesus as and when He did, justify, indeed compel, our faith in Providence?; in history can we discern the operation of a moral law, *i.e.* can we reaffirm the prophetic interpretation of history?; apart from Christ, have we any reliable standard or safeguard of progress?; can any vision or hope of a good time coming on earth



satisfy our deepest spiritual needs? While it is difficult to say of any one chapter that it excels another, special interest perhaps attaches to that on great men and social forces, inasmuch as it affords Mr. Wood opportunity to submit Kautsky's reconstruction of the life of Jesus to searching examination and convincing demolition. No extracts from the book can do justice to it; most emphatically it is a book to get.

### THE CHURCH OF GOD.

The Russian revolution had the effect of exiling to Paris a considerable number of devoted Russian Christians who in the land of the stranger have constituted a vigorous Orthodox community. Under the fostering care of the Student Christian Movement bonds of sympathetic intercourse have been forged between those exiles and a section of the Church of England; and this mutual sympathy and desire for better understanding has been focused in the institution of the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius. The Fellowship have had several conferences, that of last summer discussing the subject of the Church. Papers read at that Conference are now published in *The Church of God: An Anglo-Russian Symposium* (S.P.C.K.; 7s. 6d. net). The Bishop of Truro writes a preface, and the writers and their subjects are—Rev. E. L. Mascal, 'Christ and the Church'; Canon Goudge, 'The Biblical Conception of the Church in Relation to the World'; Rev. G. V. Florovsky, 'The Catholicity of the Church'; Canon Kirk, 'Loyalty to the Church'; Professor G. P. Fedotov, 'Orthodoxy and Historical Criticism'; Rev. Ivan R. Young, 'Eucharistic Worship'; A. Karpov, 'Personality and the Church'; Rev. D. J. Chitty, 'The Communion of Saints'; Professor S. Bulgakov, 'Religion and Art'; Professor A. V. Kartashov, 'The Church and National Life'; Dr. N. M. Zernov, 'The Church and the Confessions.'

The volume is of interest, first, as showing that a need is becoming felt for a new study of the doctrine of the Church. There has been overmuch discussion of the notes or marks of the Church without what is surely a necessary preliminary inquiry—are we agreed as to what the Church is? It is of interest, secondly, for the singularly high standard of the individual contributions. A minor point of interest is the means afforded of comparing and contrasting the outlook of Churchmen so different in mental build as English and Russian. Several of the writers have the common interest of trying to get to something deeper than the Pro-

testant and the Catholic conception of the function of the Church, something which might at once reconcile both and correct each.

The whole symposium exhales a very admirable and Christian spirit, and the stoutest Protestant will find many things very well and truly said. Nothing but good could come to the participants in such a conference; and we are sure that this record of their proceedings is calculated to do great and much more widespread good.

### RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

*Man and God* (S.P.C.K.; 7s. 6d. net), by the Rev. Lindsay Dewar, Canon and Chancellor of York, is an essay on the psychology and philosophy of religious experience. It is a subject on which there have been many books in recent years, and not a few of them of outstanding merit; yet this is so up-to-date a work that it will be found very useful. It cannot, however, be said to carry the debate a stage farther. Indeed the first chapter, which is on the nature of religious experience, shows neither independence nor clarity of thought. But the remaining chapters are written more firmly, and one cannot but admire the author's diligence as a student and the width of his range of reading.

The first chapter is followed by one on the sceptical attack on religious experience, in which the positions of Freud and Jung are criticised. Then the orthodox attack on religious experience is considered. By this is understood the view expressed by Dr. Tennant when he says: 'Experience must be interpreted atheously but not atheistically.' It is the view of which St. Thomas is the classical exponent. As against it the author finds support in Otto.

Turning to the interpretation of religion, Canon Dewar reaches the affirmation that there is a specific religious experience, and finds in the empirical or religious argument the fundamental ground of religious belief. Apart from the empirical or religious argument the God of the philosophers, he says, would never have been worshipped, and would, in fact, cease even to be called God. This is a point of view which is being much emphasized in recent theistic apology, though few theistic apologists would put it so emphatically as this: *colo deum, ergo deus est*.

The Biblical student will turn with interest and not without being rewarded to the closing chapters on religious experience in the Old and New Testaments. In the Old Testament we find everywhere the chief reliance placed upon first-hand religious



experience. This it is which gives Hebraic religion its virility and distinguishes it sharply from the Hellenistic tradition, which tended always to pantheism. The Hebrew tradition, stressing as it continually does the importance of personal fellowship with the 'living' God, as contrasted with all rationalistic attempts to understand Him, has been the saviour of true religion.

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PROFESSOR LAMONT ON CHRIST AND  
THE WORLD OF THOUGHT.

It is over seven years since the Rev. Daniel Lamont, D.D., was appointed to the Chair of Apologetics and Practical Training in the New College. There he has established a high reputation, and we rejoice that his contribution to Apologetic is now in part available to a wider public than the class-room—*Christ and the World of Thought* (T. & T. Clark; 9s. net). The Christian faith stands in constant need of Apologetic. The thought-atmosphere changes so often, and often so rapidly, not only among the *intelligentsia* but among the general public, that a new approach to the general mind is frequently necessary. Dr. Lamont's book was worth waiting for. If we mistake not, he has given us an Apologetic work which will more and more rise in esteem, until perchance a new prevalent *Weltanschauung* necessitates a fresh handling of some of the problems dealt with. We should except from this limitation the second portion, which deals with the main Christian doctrines. There Dr. Lamont's treatment, while it is never oblivious of present-day difficulties, is of far more than temporary value. As to the mode of presentation, the book is extraordinarily well written; the style is crisp and often epigrammatical, lit up with flashes of humour. Not all parts, especially in the first portion, 'The Frontier of Thought,' will prove easy reading for all. Lucid as Dr. Lamont's treatment is, after all we are not all mathematicians, and some will make little of 'the square root of  $-1$ ,' even when it is called *i*. As Dr. Lamont points out, understanding of such things, introduced as illustrations, is not necessary to the argument. Nor does it seem necessary to get clear grip of all the paradoxes about time that are here unfolded. The main line of Dr. Lamont's argumentation is plain enough. He is concerned in this whole first section to show that Thought has its frontiers; we come to 'a veil past which we cannot see'; reason leads us up to a Beyond but cannot explore it. Our thought moves from the *I-object* relation to the *I-thou* relation, which is

very different, and finally to the *I-Absolute*, which differs from both. Thought leaves us confronting a Beyond which can be only one or other of two—fate or intelligent Will.

For our knowledge of the Beyond, the Beyond itself must speak to us. Here we are into the second portion, which, as indicated, deals with the Christian verities under the chapter headings—Faith and Reason; Revelation; the Lord Jesus Christ; Christian Faith; Prayer; the Christian Idea of the Universe; the Trinity; Ethic and Apocalyptic; Personal Decision. Every chapter is stimulating to the mind, and will confirm the faith of the believer and meet the difficulties of the honest inquirer.

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A NEW COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE  
TO THE ROMANS.

A new Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans by a Roman Catholic scholar is assured of a welcome by Protestants, as well as by Catholics, especially when it is written for students of theology and also in the hope 'that it will be useful to all who are interested in the teaching of St. Paul.' Such a Commentary has been written by the Very Rev. Patrick Canon Boylan, M.A., D.D., D.Litt., Professor of Sacred Scripture and Oriental Languages, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, and Professor of Eastern Languages, University College, Dublin. The Commentary, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans* (Gill, Dublin; 17s. 6d. net), which is accompanied with the author's translation in English, has as its chief purpose the setting forth of the thought of the Apostle, and it makes a very readable volume. Although no attempt is made to supply materials for a history of the exegesis of the Epistle, frequent references are made to the works of Lagrange and Lietzmann, and occasional allusions to C. H. Dodd's Commentary and to Moffatt's Translation appear. Curiously enough, Sanday and Headlam's monumental work is almost entirely neglected. On the linguistic side many useful comments are made, and the many criticisms of the Vulgate text are both interesting and valuable.

Naturally Dr. Boylan is faced by difficulties when he has to treat doctrinal problems on which the Council of Trent has pronounced, and sympathetic readers will not be surprised that he does not enter upon any elaborate investigation of the meaning of *δικαίω* and its compounds, and interprets *δικαιοσύνη* as 'a justice which makes men "just" who were previously "unjust."' In 2<sup>13</sup> he translates *δικαιωθήσονται* by 'shall be regarded as just.' Occasionally Dr. Boylan cannot resist



a thrust at Lutherans, but in the main his book is remarkably free from ecclesiastical hostility. On important points his comments are often interesting. In 3<sup>25</sup> *ἱλαστήριον* is translated 'propitiatory sacrifice,' but the rendering 'Reconciler' is also mentioned, and Dr. Boylan remarks that it is quite possible that St. Paul has several nuances of the word before his mind. In 5<sup>1</sup> he decides for *ἐχομεν* rather than for *ἐχομεν* and points out that the distinction between *ο* and *ω* had already disappeared for ordinary speech by the New Testament period. While commenting on 5<sup>19</sup> he says that the rendering of *ἐφ' ᾧ* by 'because' is widely accepted by Catholic commentators, and he explains the pronoun 'I' in 7<sup>14</sup> of 'Paul as representing the unregenerate man generally.' It is tempting to continue these examples, but enough perhaps has been said to show that the author knows the difficulties and can express views which repay consideration.

The treatment of the problems of Introduction is competent but somewhat general, except in relation to the question of the destination of ch. 16. Here Dr. Boylan reaches the conclusion that 'the reasons advanced for the Ephesian destination of 16<sup>1-23</sup> cannot be regarded as valid.' It is, however, as a theologian and an expositor that Dr. Boylan must be judged, rather than as an historical critic, and there is every reason for readers outside his communion to feel grateful to him for his capable study of St. Paul's thought.

### NEW LIGHT ON THE HANOVERIAN CHURCH.

*Church and State in England in the XVIIIth Century* (Cambridge University Press; 21s. net), by the Rev. Norman Sykes, M.A., D.Phil., Professor of History in the University of London (Westfield College), is composed of the Birkbeck Lectures in Ecclesiastical History delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge, 1931-33. It is a learned and scholarly attempt to portray the salient characteristics of the English Church during the century which divides the 'domestic revolution' of 1689 from the 'French cataclysm' of 1789. Professor Sykes is of opinion that the Hanoverian Church has received unduly severe treatment at the hands of the historian. It is an opinion forced upon him by his study not only of Abbey and Overton's important work of half a century ago, but also of new sources of information, both printed and manuscript, which have since been made available for the investigation of students.

The discussion is introduced by a survey of the heritage of the Caroline epoch, of which the Hanoverian age was the descendant by affiliation and reaction; and it is brought to a close by a consideration of the effect upon the Church of the religious and social changes operative during the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

It is no comprehensive sketch of the English Church in the eighteenth century that Professor Sykes presents to his readers. He has been content to call attention to aspects of the Hanoverian Church which have hitherto received comparatively little examination, in the hope that he may make some contribution towards that 'juster and more equitable verdict' which history has yet to pronounce. The Hanoverian Church has been pilloried for slackness and inefficiency and for its Latitudinarianism in doctrine and worship, and Professor Sykes would here put forward evidential material calling for a certain revision of this judgment.

In the main portion of his volume he takes first the administrative system of the Church in the eighteenth century, beginning with an account of the episcopate: on the one hand in its political capacity, the influence of the bench in Parliament and politics being here treated; and on the other hand in its ecclesiastical capacity, here being treated the discharge of their spiritual duties by the diocesan administrators.

Then is described the status of the higher clergy, the cathedral dignitaries and pluralists, with notes on the social classes from which they were recruited and on the way to high preferment. After that is described the state and condition of the lower clergy, possessed only of the poorer benefices or, as unbeneficed curates, taking the place of absentee incumbents.

Attention is then directed to the parochial standards of the Georgian age. The religious tradition is admitted to be homespun and practical, but it is urged that the Holy Communion was not so neglected as it is usually represented as being. This is followed by a review of the chief contemporary theories concerning the nature of the alliance between Church and State.

No record of the eighteenth-century Church in England may evade the challenge of the names of Bishops Hoadly and Watson, whose episcopates are often described as primacies of infamy, as showing the depths to which Whiggery and Latitudinarianism could drag the Church. But their episcopates Professor Sykes would set in what appears to be their true significance, though he is far from condoning absenteeism in a bishop.



## DEMOCRACY.

No Christian minister who believes in the spiritual equality of all men, the liberty of conscience, and the independence of the Church can be indifferent to the common and urgent danger of the political absolutism which is becoming dominant in so many lands. This challenge to democracy is at bottom a challenge of distinctly Christian convictions. The volume by Mr. C. Delisle Burns (*The Challenge to Democracy*, Allen & Unwin; 5s. net) takes up the challenge confidently by trying to show how democracy may justify itself. After describing the crisis, the author discusses how democracy may be realized in the City, in the Nation, and in the Family of Nations; next he discusses the ends to which democracy should direct its efforts—health, wealth in the making and in the using, education as the only means by which a community can be constituted as democracy demands. Lastly, he shows how by the realization of democracy a nation can pass from barbarism to civilization, and the value in this transition of the *nobodies* (the common people), if they choose and follow the right leaders. With the practical measures advocated we find ourselves in hearty agreement generally. We welcome especially the emphasis on the need of the spirit of community, the recognition by the individual of the claims of society, and the recognition by the society of the interests of the individual—the distinctively Christian idea of the body, in which all the members suffer or rejoice together. A very high moral standard is assumed as necessary, if democracy is to succeed. What we miss in the volume is any recognition of religion, especially the Christian religion, as setting the highest standard, evoking the most constraining motive, and providing the most adequate power for the realization of a democracy such as the author desires. Are the churches in any degree to blame that he can so completely ignore their value as an influence to make democracy what it should be?

conveys a good deal of information as to the great Stoic's early days which has not hitherto been used in attempts to write something like a biography. Dr. Hayward has given us a good book. The chapters dealing with the general state of the Empire, and of religion, thought, and culture within it at the time, will be found very interesting and very illuminating.

The 'Roy Calvert Memorial Lecture' was delivered by Mr. Carl Heath, and has been issued under the title *Crime and Humane Ethics* (Allenson; 1s. net). Roy Calvert was the Secretary of the National Council for the Abolition of the Death Penalty, and to this cause he gave all his strength until his death in 1933. The Memorial Lecture is intended to carry on his work, and is inspired by his ideas and aims. The main drift of it is that crime is largely the result of social conditions, and that there is in man a divine element which can be developed by sympathy and culture. The death penalty, in these circumstances, is an irrational and futile expedient.

A book which serves critical, expository, and devotional ends is rare; but just such a volume has appeared in Dr. C. A. Anderson Scott's *Footnotes to St. Paul* (Cambridge University Press; 7s. 6d. net). The book contains a useful summary of each of the Epistles of St. Paul, together with notes on difficult passages and longer notes on outstanding Pauline ideas, and in the closing pages there is a valuable section on 'Paul's Message to his Fellow-Men' which, in spite of its brevity, gives more food for thought than is to be found in many a pretentious discussion. Dr. Anderson Scott believes that 'no man ever understood Jesus, his teaching, his personality, and his value for mankind, so well as Paul' (p. vii), and he writes because he thinks that it is 'of the first importance that men should understand Paul.' We heartily commend this book to preachers, students, and general readers; it is pure gold.

Dr. F. H. Hayward is well known as an educationist with views of his own. He is also known as the writer of a suggestive study of 'The Unknown Cromwell.' From his facile pen comes now *Marcus Aurelius: A Saviour of Men* (Allen & Unwin; 10s. 6d. net). He has been moved to this because, among other reasons, the Correspondence of Fronto, made available in the Loeb Library by Dr. Haines,

In these days of financial stringency missionary societies are faced with problems of retrenchment and retreat. The Church Missionary Society called a conference at Swanwick last September to consider the situation and to devise a policy in view of it. The message of this conference is given by Dr. W. Wilson Cash, the General Secretary of the Society, in a little book entitled *The Responsibility of Success* (C.M.S.; 1s. net). The title indicates one of the principal findings of the Conference,



namely, that the very success of missionary work had mainly contributed to make the present crisis acute. Ever-widening fields are white to the harvest, and call for more and still more labourers. Remarkable instances of this are given. On the other hand, the Conference found that the deadness of the Home Church was a main cause of its failure in missionary zeal. Conversions at home must precede expansion abroad. One of the findings of the Conference accordingly was 'that it is inconsistent for members of the Church to support by money and prayer those who are sent out by the Church to witness for Christ overseas, and not to give their personal witness to Him at home.' Dr. Cash has presented the case for mission work with great force and impressiveness. His book will repay careful study by all who in any way have the conduct of foreign missions, and to the general Christian reader it will be at once a stimulus and a rebuke.

Here is another of the series 'Great Religions of the East'—*Outline of Buddhism*, by Mr. C. H. S. Ward (Epworth Press; 2s. 6d. net). It is an excellent half-crown's worth. Of the mass of works on Buddhism not a few are quite worthless, some of more value, and only one here and one there of any genuine helpfulness. This little book is definitely one of these last, though one may differ from it now and then, with some assurance. Mr. Ward is a very orthodox Buddhist interpreter. Such heretics as Mrs. Rhys Davids he mentions and passes by, for he is not concerned with the quest for primitive Buddhism, but with what confronts him in the Pali Canon as it stands. But even of that he gives a rigidly orthodox interpretation. Poussin, for example, is only mentioned casually in the Introduction, and does not appear in the slightly disappointing bibliography. And while what is stated is as a rule unchallengeable, there are often other sides to things left quietly in the shadow. This method makes the author's task an easier one, but less convincing to a reader with some knowledge of the subject.

Still, with that limitation, this is a valuable introduction. The discussion of such elusive topics as Rebirth without Transmigration is quite curiously lucid, where lucidity is not a matter easily attained even for Buddhist minds.

The latest addition to the 'Westminster Books' is an apologetic volume, *Is it Reasonable to Believe?* by the Rev. J. W. Hunkin, D.D., M.C. (Hodder & Stoughton; 3s. net). The writer follows the order

of truth in the Apostles' Creed, and his chapters are on Belief in God, in Christ, in the Holy Ghost, in the Church, Forgiveness, and Eternal Life. Both the 'mystical' and the reasonable avenues are explored, and the difficulties in the way of belief that are commonly experienced are fairly met. Books on these lines are numerous at the present time, but this one has its own place. It is a good piece of work, especially the chapter on Forgiveness, and puts into fairly simple language a number of considerations that make belief reasonable.

In *The Answers of Jesus to Job* (Marshall, Morgan & Scott; 3s. 6d. net) we have Dr. G. Campbell Morgan at his best. And many will turn in this Lenten season to this deeply evangelical book. Last month we quoted from it in 'The Christian Year,' and this should be read. Dr. Morgan does not forget how helpful illustrative matter is. 'When I went in New York to see *Green Pastures* I never shall forget the impression created upon my mind, as imaginatively but quite reverently, from the standpoint of negro mentality, the Lord is represented as viewing the world in revolt and in rebellion, and the angel Gabriel, in sympathy with God, desired to blow the trumpet, and call the judgment and blot out the sinning earth, the Lord said to him, "Gabe, it ain't no picnic bein' Gawd!" If for a moment that seems to shock the mind, let it be remembered that what I have said is true, that it was the negro outlook that expressed itself. If that be remembered, we are brought face to face with the very principle of the Cross.'

The publishers have done their part by printing the addresses in clear type and turning out a volume light to handle and at a price within the reach of all.

Dr. Inge has collected twelve devotional addresses, and these have been published at the request of the Bishop of London as the Lenten Book for 1935 (Longmans; 2s. 6d. net). The meditations are all on fundamental things, the title being taken from the first meditation—*The Gate of Life*. Other subjects are 'The Kingdom of God,' 'The Church and the World,' 'The Justice of God,' and 'War.' All contain much that is eminently quotable. We have given one address in abridged form in 'The Christian Year' this month.

This is a vital book, and we have pleasure in drawing attention to it and endorsing the Bishop of London's preface: 'I heartily commend this book to the many people who are terribly troubled by the difficulty of reconciling the state of the



world as we see it to-day with a belief in the Power and Love of an Almighty God. The subject is treated with great frankness and reverence by one of the acutest brains in Europe.'

In the *Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, xiv., for 1933-34 (Milford; 11s. 6d.), we have a full and detailed account of the exploration of Eastern Palestine or Transjordan, undertaken in 1932 and 1933 by Professor Nelson Glueck and party. No fewer than one hundred and fifty sites were visited from Ammân in the north as far south as Shôbek. All periods of habitation from the Early Bronze Age to the time of the Nabatæans are described, and there are twenty-eight plates of tells, buildings, and pottery. Not all scholars will agree with the view that there was 'an almost complete gap' in the history of settled communities in these regions from the eighteenth century till as late as the thirteenth, and it is well that Professor Glueck admits at least that the land was not 'completely unpeopled.' Nothing is more precarious than the hard-and-fast rules that are sometimes applied to pottery dating. The volume also contains a discussion by Professor Millar Burrows of Yale on the topography of ancient Jerusalem, as given in Neh 3<sup>1-32</sup>, and notes by Dr. Cyrus H. Gordon on an Aramaic Incantation in Iraq Museum. The *Annual*, like its predecessors, is of value to every Semitic student, and should find a welcome place beside the others.

In these days when discussion is rife on the subject of the nature of the State and what limits, if any, are to be set to the obedience of the individual subject, many will be grateful to Mr. E. F. Carritt for his brief and penetrating study, *Morals and Politics: Theories of their Relation from Hobbes and Spinoza to Marx and Bosanquet* (Milford; 6s. net). The title explains the contents so far; but there is a second part, positive not merely historical, in which the author deals with Philosophy of History, Political Rights and Duties, and in a concluding chapter with the General Will and the Contract. It is all very lucid and helpful, and we have seldom seen such value packed into so small compass.

*Christ and Evolution* (Milford; 9s. net), by Professor George A. Barton, Ph.D., S.T.D., LL.D., of Philadelphia, is a study of the doctrine of redemption in the light of modern knowledge. Dr. Barton is well known as a learned scholar in the fields of Biblical study and the History of Religions.

When he began his ministry fifty-five years ago he was an Arminian in theology and a 'Fundamentalist.' How far he has travelled since then will be gathered from the pages before us, in which he considers the subjects of the dawn of conscience in man, the growth of man's conception of God, Christ's Messianic mission, His great social and ethical teachings, and the development of the Church.


Man never fell, says Dr. Barton, from a state of perfection. The first sin was not the heinous sin of a perfectly moral being, but rather the venial sin of an ignorant child. Since man did not fall from a perfect state, he did not need to be restored to a perfection which he had never possessed. What he did need was the moral quickening and the moral power to enable conscience to triumph over appetite and passion. Such quickening and power could come from a Saviour who could renew and strengthen the will and integrate the personality.

But does God need to be propitiated and appeased before He can bring Himself to forgive sin? An examination of man's knowledge of God through the ages leads Dr. Barton to the conclusion that God is engaged in a great creative work that is far from complete, and that instead of being unreasonably angry with His children He pities them; that, indeed, the whole movement for the redemption and uplift of man originated in God's love.

The Person of Jesus Christ is then reviewed in the light of recent criticism, and the death of Jesus described as a sacrifice to human selfishness and hatred, and not as a sacrifice made to God, as demanding it before He could forgive man. It is, however, the mediatorship of Jesus in His life and death that saves man, giving man the assurance of forgiveness for past failure and union with a new source of moral power.

The same modernness of outlook combined with an essentially evangelical standpoint shows itself in Dr. Barton's treatment of the Christian ethic and the Christian Church. The Kingdom of God must come within before it can come without; the inside of the cup and platter must be cleansed before the outside can become clean. And again, creeds and theology are only explanations of the facts of the religious life; worship is the experience in which the life forces of the spirit are renewed.

The whole volume may be commended as a fresh and up-to-date commentary, from a liberal or at any rate modern conservative standpoint, on the great themes of the Christian faith.





*Devotion and Discipleship* (S.P.C.K.; 6s. net) is a collection of the more important devotional works of that distinguished New Testament scholar and writer, the late Rev. A. H. McNeile, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Dublin. There is an Introduction and Memoir by the Rev. W. C. Simpson, Vicar of St. Bartholomew's, Dublin, and a Foreword by the Master of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge. The books in question are (1) *Self-Training in Prayer*, (2) *After This Manner Pray Ye*, (3) *Self-Training in Meditation*, (4) *Alive unto God*, (5) *He Led Captivity Captive*, (6) *Discipleship*. Says the memoirist: 'He was first and last a Disciple, a disciplined, intimate friend of Jesus Christ,' and one could not peruse his devotional works without realizing how true this is. The industry by which he became so well equipped as a theological scholar was carried into his practice of the spiritual life. We commend this volume, so full of piety and unobtrusive learning, to those who have not read Dr. McNeile's devotional works. Those who have read them will be interested to know of their collection in so convenient a form as this.

An important and extremely valuable little book has been published by the Student Christian Movement Press with the title *Right Marriage* (6d. net). It is the joint work of a clergyman, the Rev. F. R. Barry, Canon of Westminster, Mr. Claud Mullins, a Metropolitan magistrate, and Mr. Douglas White, M.A., M.D. It is designed to be put into the hands of engaged couples in order

to prepare them for married life. The book is perfectly frank, both on the physical side of marriage and on such matters as the use of contraceptives, and wise counsels are given, both on these subjects and also on the practical difficulties that emerge in the relations of husband and wife. We could not think of a book better adapted to its purpose than this one, and hope for its wide usefulness.

We are in receipt of a copy of *The Mysticism of Ignatius of Antioch*, a thesis submitted to the University of Pennsylvania by Mr. Frederick Augustus Schilling, and printed in Philadelphia in 1932. We do not know whether or not it is available to the public; if not, it is to be regretted, for it is a singularly able and scholarly study of one who in some ways is the most important figure in early Christian history after St. Paul. After full consideration of the Ignatian Epistles, the writer sums up Ignatius as follows: 'His personal communion with Christ was of the highest type, like that of the Apostle Paul. His work and life as bishop was sober and practical, balanced by tradition and practice. As ecstatic prophet he has been one among many, and respected as one who was in closer touch with the divine than the average Christian. He was a true mystic, with the ecstatic and rational, personal and cultic elements well balanced and the ecstatic under conscious control. . . . From the view-point of *Religionsgeschichte* he was an epitome of the religious syncretism of his age.'

## Some Outstanding New Testament Problems.

### V. Luke's Disputed Passion-Source.

BY PROFESSOR ALFRED MORRIS PERRY, PH.D., D.D., BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, BANGOR, MAINE, U.S.A.

I. 'DOES Luke contain an independent Passion narrative?' The question has been brought to the forefront in the source study of the Synoptic Gospels, both because of the historical value an independent Passion narrative would possess, and also because it is one of the corner-stones of the Proto-Luke hypothesis. And, although the real contributions of the *Formgeschichtliche* school have

in some quarters quite largely detracted from the interest in literary criticism, the question is by no means an idle one; for not only are the documentary sources one of the important stages in the formulation of the Tradition, but the longer-established and more objective methods of the literary criticism will yield more assured results within their own limits.



We must summarize these results briefly, so far as they concern Luke, since their limits have too often been overlooked in the attempt to push further behind the known data.

(1) We know that Luke used Mark, and we know how he used Mark. This conclusion, reached by comparing Luke with Mark and Matthew, rests on two facts—a considerable agreement in verbal expression, and a large agreement in order. *Without either one of these indications, especially the verbal, we should be unable to demonstrate the fundamental premise of the Two Document theory.* We cannot therefore loosely extend conclusions based on these agreements to sections where such agreement is lacking.

(2) We know, from similar evidence, that Luke used Q. How he used Q we are less certain, since agreement in order with Matthew is slight. By analogy with their treatment of Mark, we may conclude that this was Matthew's fault, not Luke's; but this remains a deduction for which complete demonstration is lacking.

(3) We can discover other materials in Luke, not accounted for above, and may reasonably assume that many of them were drawn from another source or sources unknown to Matthew.

(4) We can plainly observe that the relation of Luke's Passion narrative to Mark's (and indeed to Matthew's) differs from the relation of their narratives of the Ministry. The evidence of this was given its classical statement by Sir John Hawkins in one of his contributions to the *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem*; <sup>1</sup> though the fact was indeed noted by one of the first formulators of the Two-Document hypothesis.<sup>2</sup>

The evidence is essentially as follows: (a) 'The verbal correspondence with the Marcan source is about twice as great in the Lucan account of the Ministry as it is in the Lucan account of the Passion'—53 per cent. as against 27; <sup>3</sup> (b) 'Luke avails himself of the liberty of transposition four times as freely in his Passion narrative,' with twelve transpositions in this brief section as against seven in all the rest of the Marcan material, and only one of them significant; <sup>4</sup> (c) the Passion narrative,

only two-fifths as long, contains twice as much interwoven matter that may be regarded as adding to our knowledge—34½ verses—and these additions are also more important. (d) To Hawkins' list we may add another feature, Luke's omissions of Marcan items (e.g. Mk 14<sup>26-28, 41f. 51f. 56-61</sup> 15<sup>16-20, 29, 34f. 44f.</sup>). There is more precedent for this in the earlier narratives, yet it too shows a loose use of Mark.

These are objective facts. They demand explanation. *Luke changed his editorial method of using Mark when he entered upon the Passion narrative; the question we must answer is, What made him do it?*

Before we attempt an answer, however, we ought to hearken to Canon Streeter's reminder <sup>5</sup> regarding the 'unconscious assumptions' which have so often prejudiced Synoptic studies—particularly the assumption that 'it is improbable that the same or similar incidents or sayings should have been recorded in more than one source,' and the assumption that the Evangelist must necessarily have preferred the source which happens to be best known to us.

Now we do know that Luke must have had Mark's Passion narrative before him; but we ought also to remember that we could hardly prove even this, had we not the much more decisive evidence of his use of the rest of Mark. It is clear, too, that between any two possible Passion narratives there must be very considerable similarity, so that agreements between them would be closer than between narratives of other portions of the Ministry. The very minimum of such agreement is found in the outline given by Paul (1 Co 11<sup>23</sup> 15<sup>3</sup>): (a) the Last Supper, on the night before—(b) the betrayal; (c) the death of Christ; (d) His burial; (e) His resurrection on the third day; (f) His appearances to the disciples. All this was in the Tradition by A.D. 50, and, in addition, we should expect a narrative source to make some mention of the trial which led up to Jesus' death. A general similarity of subject-matter, therefore, can hardly furnish adequate proof of documentary relationship.

II. What explanation, then, can be given for the form of Luke's Passion narrative? Setting aside the idea that there were two different editors, a suggestion precluded by the stylistic unity of the whole Gospel, and setting aside also the explanation that the change of method was entirely capricious—which is inconceivable in an author who wrote under the responsibility laid upon the Evangelist by both his subject and his readers—the answers to our question will all come down to the one word,

<sup>1</sup> In the chapter, 'Three Limitations to St. Luke's Use of St. Mark's Gospel,' especially pp. 76-94. In an independent study (*Sources of Luke's Passion Narrative*, Chicago, 1920) I sought to present the data in full detail, and to make a closer examination of their bearing.

<sup>2</sup> C. G. Wilke, *Der Urevangelist*, 1838, p. 482 f. The centennial of this date ought to receive due recognition.

<sup>3</sup> Hawkins, *op cit.* 86.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.* 89.

<sup>5</sup> B. H. Streeter, *The Four Gospels*, 1924, pp. 227-30.



'Tradition.' But there are three channels in which the tradition might have flowed.

(1) *Ecclesiastical tradition.*—The theological beliefs and liturgical practices of the Church in and for which the Evangelist wrote may have led him in all sincerity to modify the Marcan representation, regarding it as incomplete and misleading. This explanation, while rarely explicitly stated, seems to be the premise of those who see in Luke's divergences from Mark a large amount of editorial modification.

(2) *Historical traditions.*—The oral tradition, which Papias not only attested but valued so highly, perhaps half a century later, may well have furnished Luke with accounts of many incidents which he wished to weave into the Marcan Passion narrative. This could be accomplished, in a story so closely articulated, only by conflation—not by Luke's earlier method of using sources in blocks—and hence there would be much less verbal agreement with Mark.

(3) *A written source.*—If Luke already possessed a written Passion narrative which he preferred to that of Mark, and upon which he based his own, adding occasional touches from Mark, the phenomena would be satisfactorily explained; though the considerable agreement between this source and Mark might need some further explanation. Answers to the question propounded at the beginning of this article, and the attitudes of scholars in general, divide between the written documentary source and the various channels of oral tradition.

III. The facts are now quite generally recognized; but interpretations differ—in general, according as the interpreter approaches from an inspection of the small details or from a survey of the larger trend.<sup>1</sup>

(1) The traditional way of approaching these phenomena has been a method of attrition, dealing with each instance by itself, emphasizing its (necessary!) resemblances to the Marcan narrative, and explaining them in most instances as due to editorial modification of Mark. This was the method of Wilke, and of nearly all the nineteenth-century historians of Jesus; M. Goguel follows it in his *Life of Jesus* and in his recent attack on the

Proto-Luke theory;<sup>2</sup> and it appears in its most persuasive form in Professor J. M. Creed's *Commentary*.

This method of explanation, however, though it may account acceptably for any individual divergence of Luke from Mark, does not satisfactorily answer the question which the cumulative facts pose: it cannot explain why Luke's literary method of using Mark should change so markedly. Theological influences might well be intensified in the Passion narrative; but it remains difficult to see how they could be limited to it so as to produce such a marked change in literary handling, since they seem to have affected Matthew's handling of Mark not at all, and they ought to be very clearly described to make such an explanation really credible. Historical tradition might have offered some corrections of the Marcan narrative; but it can hardly explain the large number of transpositions, nor do the variations from Mark have the aspect of mere additions—rather the most characteristic features of the Marcan story have all but disappeared.

The limitations of the method appear when we find M. Goguel,<sup>3</sup> for instance, insisting, 'The words, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit," are an [editorial] echo of Stephen's saying, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit" (Ac 7<sup>59</sup>),' and again, 'The words, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do" [whose textual authenticity he defends], are an illustration of Jesus' own command, "Bless them that curse you," or they too may be reminiscent of Stephen (Ac 7<sup>60</sup>).' Apart from questions of the priority of Luke's 'former treatise,' this is to set the disciple above the master—and the Evangelist over both—in a fashion that makes one wonder what it was that gave initial impetus to the Christian movement. Professor Creed<sup>4</sup> is on safer ground when he admits that 'We have every reason to assume that here as elsewhere he has used the Marcan Gospel, but his other source may have also given an account of the crucifixion with characteristic features of its own.'

(2) Sir John Hawkins hesitated to draw from his observations the conclusion which he himself recognized as logical, that Luke was using a different source, and preferred rather to suppose that in the process of catechetical teaching Luke had reshaped

<sup>2</sup> M. Goguel, *The Life of Jesus*, Eng. tr., London, 1933; 'Luke and Mark,' in *Harvard Theol. Rev.*, xxvi. (1933), 1-56—see esp. pp. 26-39.

<sup>3</sup> *Harvard Theol. Rev.*, xxvi. (1933), 37.

<sup>4</sup> J. M. Creed, *The Gospel according to St. Luke*, London, 1930, p. 285.

<sup>1</sup> Only the most careful and intimate study will reveal the exact facts or their true significance. I should heartily endorse the sentiment of Professor Grant, that the mechanical labour of polychroming the parallels in a good harmony is an absolute essential, and that by it 'one gains a grasp of the problem and of the proposed solution which nothing else can supply' (F. C. Grant, *The Growth of the Gospels*, New York, 1933, pp. 54, 64 n.).



the Marcan narrative by 'a long and gradual conflation in the mind, rather than a simple conflation by the pen.'<sup>1</sup> This explanation does find good grounds in the close interweaving of details which we often find in these sections, and in close paralleling of Marcan incidents in varying language. Yet it is tantamount to saying that the Passion narrative was derived from Mark at an earlier stage than the Galilean narratives, which seems to introduce a hazardous complexity (if not a Proto-Luke !) into Luke's use of Mark.

(3) The conclusion which Hawkins evaded has been accepted by many scholars. Professor Burkitt<sup>2</sup> believed that Q contained a Passion narrative, and nearly all of those who with Bernhard Weiss<sup>3</sup> find a third main source in Luke are inclined to extend it through to the end of the Gospel. In 1924 Canon Streeter lent the weight of his scholarship, and of the Proto-Luke hypothesis, to the same explanation; and he was immediately reinforced by Dr. Taylor.<sup>4</sup> There is therefore a very respectable, and probably a growing, body of opinion, especially in Great Britain, that the Passion narrative of Luke is in the main independent of Mark.

Professor Creed<sup>5</sup> enters a number of objections to this explanation. (a) Proto-Luke, he alleges, is amorphous, Mark furnishes the outline, and 'the additional material seems to be secondary'—an objection which has some ground if all the outline material be assigned (*ex hypothesi* !) to Mark; but it cannot be so easily sustained if the evidence of *actual literary* relationship is more carefully scrutinized with the *possibility* of a second source always in mind. (b) 'Signs of the use of Mark are clear,' both in the interpolation of complete sections and of single phrases, and these 'are intelligible if the Lucan narrative is a recasting and expansion of the Marcan text'—though a review of the passages

will suggest that the opposite hypothesis, that of interpolation of Mark into a non-Markan outline, furnishes an explanation at least as satisfactory. (c) This, however, Professor Creed rules out, with the statement, 'If Luke had already written or found a full and independent non-Markan narrative, it seems unlikely that afterwards he would have interpolated occasional sentences and verses from Mark.' I must beg leave to differ: not only is this, in essence, what Luke in his preface professes to have done, but it is exactly what any one who rejects the Proto-Luke hypothesis has to assume that he *has* done with Mark, surely a 'full and independent narrative' ! And who among us has ever dispatched the final proofs of a work without shortly wishing he might recall them for further correction and addition? In all these objections, Professor Creed seems to have made the mistake of assuming that no other source *could* parallel Mark.

(d) More cogent is his objection (p. lxiv) that 'at crucial points the Marcan source shows through.' There is not space to discuss these points in detail: at some of them the source might not appear to be definitely Marcan, others might be explained as occurring in the transition from the Marcan to the non-Markan source; but I think that with some the objection would be sustained. (e) An allied objection may be added: that the reconstructed non-Markan source would parallel the Marcan so closely, even in many incidental points of the narrative, that it could hardly be supposed to have been entirely independent.

IV. It would appear, therefore, that no explanation yet offered will account for Luke's Passion narrative with entire satisfaction. On the one hand, to explain it as an editorial recasting of Mark, with a few fugitive traditions incorporated, does not explain the cumulative evidence of Luke's marked change of literary relationship, nor can *documentary* relationship be fully demonstrated on the basis of the remaining agreements. On the other hand, Luke's differences from Mark are more in form than in substance, both in detail and in the general outline of the story; and this suggests that there is some relation, even though it be not the direct documentary dependence of the earlier narratives.

Certainly, the theory of a special source for the Passion narrative is to be preferred, since it explains more of the facts than does any other, even though the source must have been given a somewhat extensive revision when Mark came to hand. I believe that a solution of the difficulties might be reached if it were possible to carry the relation of

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.* 90.

<sup>2</sup> F. C. Burkitt, *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, 1906, p. 134.

<sup>3</sup> B. Weiss, 'Die Quellen der synoptischen Uebersetzung' (*Texte u. Untersuchungen*, xxxiii.), Leipzig, 1908; cf., e.g., B. S. Easton, *Gospel according to St. Luke*, New York, 1926.

<sup>4</sup> B. H. Streeter, *op. cit.* 202; V. Taylor, *Behind the Third Gospel*, Oxford, 1926, pp. 33-75.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.* see esp. pp. lviii n., lxiii f.—though this scarcely accords the hypothesis an adequate treatment. Cf. also M. Goguel, *op. cit.*, and for rebuttal V. Taylor, *Formation of the Gospel Tradition*, London, 1933, pp. 191-201, and also the new Preface to the fourth impression (1930) of Streeter's *Four Gospels*, esp. pp. xi-xiii.

Luke and Mark back to an earlier stage and to show that Mark's Passion narrative was based upon Luke's special source or an earlier version of it.<sup>1</sup> But in the nature of the case such dependence would be more difficult to prove than even that of Mark upon Q.

Finally, was this a connected account or a group of fragments? That depends mainly on whether it was found in oral or in written form; for oral traditions will more naturally have circulated independently, written tradition in a single document. It is generally agreed, however, that Luke

<sup>1</sup> Goguel suggests (*Harvard Theol. Rev.*, xxvi. [1933] 28 f.), a somewhat similar theory of the Synoptic Apocalypse, that Luke used an *earlier* edition of Mark (cf. pp. 52-55); but the signs of sheer interpolation of Marcan verses are particularly strong in Lk 21.

uses material from special sources in nearly all parts of the Passion narrative, from the Last Supper (cf. Lk 22<sup>15-17</sup>. 28-30. 31f. 35-38), through the trial (cf. Lk 23<sup>6-16</sup>) and the Crucifixion (cf. Lk 23<sup>27-31</sup>. 39-48, etc.), to the Resurrection appearances (cf. Lk 24<sup>13-53</sup> *passim*). Adding lesser touches which are more easily ascribed to tradition than to editorial creation, Luke's special materials would seem to have touched upon almost all parts of the Passion story. And since 1 Co 11<sup>23</sup> 15<sup>3</sup> suggest that the Passion narrative was probably the first part of the Gospel story to assume connected form, at least in the Gentile churches, it seems likely that a Greek evangelist, writing among Gentile Christians, would more readily have derived this information from a connected document than gathered it from scattered oral traditions.

## A Philosopher looks at the Creeds.<sup>1</sup>

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My subject is the relation between two inquiries, on each of which separately the theological student has been much engaged. It requires no argument to show that the objects of philosophical reflection and the objects of religious faith have so much in common as to make it, if not impossible, at least extraordinary for minds concerned about either to remain aloof from the other. But it is possible, while attending to both, to pursue the threads altogether apart, or to think of them together in respect only of their termination, not of the course they run. My present purpose is to develop the idea of their respective procedures as compared with each other. What is the relation between those speculative exercises which we call philosophy and those convictions which are embodied in creeds?

In order to be clear, I am going to begin by defining my terms. The definitions I am going to give are not very good ones. Indeed, they are not so much definitions as descriptions; but if they serve as identifying labels, they will be adequate for my immediate purpose. By a philosopher I shall mean one who with an open mind, with no guide except his reason and with no material except experience, inquires freely into the ultimate character of the universe and of life. By a Creed,

on the other hand, I shall mean any one of those historic formulæ which profess to explain life and the universe not through reasoning, but through a Divine revelation. No one, I suppose, will quarrel with the way I have described a philosopher. But there may be demur to my apparent suggestion that a Creed is not the product of reasoning. I think I can hear some disciple of Dean Inge retort with Inge's favourite quotation from Whichcote: 'Sir, I oppose not rational to spiritual, for spiritual is most rational.' The Dean, however, as a good mystic, would be quick to point out that *rational* need not mean the outcome of reasoning. And when I speak of the Creeds, in contrast with philosophy, as involving this idea of *revelation*, it is enough for me to have on my side the chief inspirer of at least all the Creeds professed in the Reformed Churches. In the Letters of St. Paul I suppose no word is more common than the word 'reveal' or some synonym for it, and nothing can be clearer than that to which he opposes it. For St. Paul, at all events, what is essential in Creeds was no handiwork of a philosopher, nothing argued out by native ingenuity. Over and over again, in very varied language but always in the same sense, he declares it to have been not discovered but made known: a revelation from Him who at the first commanded light to shine out of darkness

<sup>1</sup> Address at the Annual Convocation of Pine Hill Divinity Hall, Halifax, N.S.



and did in these last days shine upon human hearts ; the uncovering of a mystery which had been kept secret since the world began : what eye had never seen nor ear heard, but God had disclosed by His spirit.

Assuming this contrast to be clear, one hastens to add that a philosopher may hold a robust religious Creed, and that a saint may be tireless in philosophical speculation. History is strewn with examples. But then we remember that history is also strewn with examples of inconsistent thinking, even in strong thinkers, and perhaps this is one of them. It is at least plain that the two tendencies, devotion to a Creed on the one hand, and philosophic reflectiveness on the other, are very different tendencies. And there has often been a certain suspicion on both sides—I know not whether it has been stronger in the philosophical or in the theological camp—that a man must be either muddle-headed or of doubtful honesty if he professes to combine them. In this matter the hasty judgment of what is called ‘common sense’ has sometimes been reinforced by learned sanction. I need not remind divinity students of the theologians who have held the study of philosophy to be valuable not for the sake of exhibiting its achievements, but rather to expose its limitations. Nor need I remind students who have had a philosophical discipline of the note of irritation in their textbooks where it has to be pointed out that the free course of thought was confused or impeded by dogma.

Shall we say, then, about the relation between these two studies that it is simply one of mutual antagonism ? Such a speaker as Earl Russell or Professor Westermarck, at the annual dinner of the Rationalist Press Association, will put this very definitely. The case is always declared to be obvious. Philosophy means an open mind, while a Creed demands a closed mind. A philosopher is always inquiring, by the light of reason, and is often forced to admit that his inquiries have failed. A theologian, on the other hand, in the high confidence which he calls ‘faith,’ is invariably successful, because—as he believes—the great secret has been confided to him from above, so that inquiries are superfluous if not impious. Can two ways of thinking more explicitly contradict each other ? How can any man pursue them both ? Can he, as Bernard Shaw says, go on indefinitely letting not the right lobe of the brain know what the left lobe doeth ?

Those who feel sure of this utter antagonism will regard the study they favour as having one of its

chief tasks in saving them from the perils of the other. This, I believe, we find fully exemplified. Next to overturning his countrymen’s belief in the British social order, there is no project quite so dear to the heart of Earl Russell as to make his philosophy destructive of the Christian Creed. He pursues this with an almost evangelical zeal. Someone told him in his youth that it was the chief purpose of a philosopher to devise rational grounds for belief in God. I am almost driven by his writings of late to suppose that in his old age he has adopted the no less narrow view that a philosopher’s main business is to destroy this belief. If you look at his latest book, entitled *The Scientific Outlook*, it will strike you—I think—as written in considerable alarm lest such men as Eddington and Jeans may surrender the fortress to the theological enemy. It is like a trumpet call, summoning back scientists to their impious allegiance. You will observe, too, about Russell, that the confidence he professes in the certainty of his conclusions has never been shaken even by his own frequent change of mind as to what the conclusions are. For my own part, again, I cannot but notice that the fierce reiteration is suggestive not so much of surer confidence as of uneasy misgiving. But the apostolic note is still there. As Voltaire said, *Ecrasez l’Infâme*. No quarter from philosophy to the theologians !

One can recall a like intolerance from the other side. I think I have known theologians who held it to be the main function of a Creed that it should stop people from dangerous inquiries. They delighted in that aphorism of Bacon which bids us attach weights rather than wings to the intellect ; and if they did not use this aphorism exactly as Bacon intended it, they justified their free translation by its homiletic value. A Creed, they held, was to be learned in early youth that it might be a protection all one’s life from what they called ‘the insolence of reason.’ I used to know a venerable divine whose opening prayer at the exercises of his theological college always included a petition that the students might be saved from philosophy ; and though, after a distinct pause, he would add ‘falsely so called,’ I had a strong feeling that the pause was deliberate, and that the further words were mechanically repeated, in reluctant deference to the text of Scripture.

This notion of necessary antagonism is in the minds of more persons than care to acknowledge it. If a philosopher has any business in the world, it is—as Plato said—to draw forth the hidden implications of common opinion, and from time to time

he is helped to do this by the merciless candour of his friends. My memory here carries me back to a conversation I had with a very candid friend on the day after I had been appointed to my first university post. 'I observe in the newspapers,' he said, 'that you are going to lecture on moral philosophy. You will draw your material, necessarily, either from the Bible or from some other source. If you take it from any other source, you will be teaching error. If you take it from the Bible, you will be wasting your students' time, for they can read the Bible at home. Choose, then, which sort of scandal you will personally constitute.' This dilemma, posed with such caustic simplicity, has tormented many a mind far subtler than that of my friend. It was Renan's puzzle—how he should select from the Christian religion those parts which might be credible for a *philosophe*. And old Professor Ferrier, of the University of St. Andrews, with many divinity students before him in his lecture-room, used to say with great emphasis: 'Gentlemen, philosophy is a body of reasoned truth; but of the two requirements, it is more important that it should be reasoned than that it should be true.' Superficially, can there be any sharper contrast with faith than that?

But one does well in these matters to be suspicious of what is superficially clear—like those cases which are said to lie in a nutshell, or those interpretations which he who runs may read. In our mysterious universe what you can read while running at the same time is not likely to be important, and you cannot put much that is valuable—either of truth or of anything else—in a nutshell. No sooner have we finished expounding to ourselves the necessary antagonism of philosophy and Creeds than we recall, with a certain sense of shock, how for long centuries they were supposed to be essentially corroborative of each other.

At all events, if they are antagonistic, they have been to a remarkable degree mutually attractive. Their records are so intertwined, the genealogy of philosophical is so linked with that of theological concepts, that one cannot conceive how the history of either could now be written without constant reference to the other. You remember, perhaps, how the discovery that Creeds were a slow growth, parallel with the slow growth of philosophies, and indeed determined by the same kind of cause, impressed no less a philosopher than John Locke. He has told us how the same impulse which made him inquire into the origin of philosophic concepts, and incidentally gave us the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, set him to work upon the origin of

theological formulæ, and incidentally yielded his *Letters on Toleration*. In each case it was a certain bewilderment at the product which sent him searching into the process. John Locke, distracted by the Creeds of his time, resolved to read the original records of the first days of Christianity for himself, and—search as he would—he could find no authority there for the requirement of these elaborate dogmas. So he decided that dogmas, like philosophies, must have developed relatively late. What would have amazed him still more would have been the discovery which is a commonplace of the historians in our time, that the development of Creeds was due primarily to the philosophers. Whatever view we take of those controversies which made the fourth century so notable, whether we think the Creeds were constructed to accommodate the Faith to philosophic demands or to protect the Faith against philosophic corruptions, it was clearly the impact of philosophy which gave birth to them.

If you look, too, at the centuries which followed, you will observe how they can be used to illustrate the view that philosophy is in its essence a corroboration of the Creeds, and that the Creeds but summarize philosophy. The significant term *ancilla theologiae*, however fiercely we may resent it now, reminds us of the long period during which it was the leaders of the Christian religion alone who in Europe put philosophic problems either to others or to themselves. It is, indeed, a far cry from the statement that in the Middle Ages theologians only were philosophers to the statement that intrinsically they should always be allies. But it is not fanciful, I think, to see in that long association proof at least of this—that the purpose for which the theologian seeks a Creed has something in common with the purpose for which a philosopher works out a system of thought. The more you search into the movement which culminated at Nicæa, the closer, I think, you will find this fundamental resemblance to be. In each case, the driving motive is the desire to reduce to order the data of experience, to find some world formula which will harmonize the facts of life. Where they differed was in that the Creed-makers of Nicæa possessed, or believed themselves to possess, a sweep of experience about which the philosopher as such knew nothing. And where their constructions clashed was just where under such circumstances one would expect them to clash.

It was not the difficulties so trite and familiar in our popular press that caused this trouble. What we now hear from a hundred voices about



the Creeds is that they are obscure and complicated, that they are variable and transient. Neither their obscurity nor their complexity is in itself any great objection to a philosopher: he too deals much in those qualities, and what would make him far more suspicious would be the perfectly clear or the perfectly simple. He knows, as Forsyth used to say, that the universe cannot be put into a formula which the undergraduate can easily remember. 'Can't you give me a succinct statement of your system?' said Victor Cousin to Hegel. 'M. Cousin,' replied Hegel, 'these matters do not lend themselves to a succinct statement, *surtout en français.*' Neither is the philosopher much disturbed to learn that the Creeds have been very different from race to race, or that branches of the one Church have fiercely denied each other's tenets and striven with apparent fruitlessness to adjust their conflict. He has seen this too in the philosophic schools, different aspects and sides of truth being emphasized with eager and even bitter exclusiveness. But whatever else he has inferred from such a conflict, there is one thing no real philosopher has ever inferred—that it proves philosophy itself to be vain. Least of all will such a man be alarmed at the spectacle of transience in a Creed. If there is anything that would completely undermine his confidence, it would be the spectacle of men trying to state the deepest convictions by which they lived, and managing to state these not only simply and clearly, but with no variety of individual or racial emphasis, and with a rigour which accumulating experience should be powerless to vary.

Professor D. G. Ritchie once said that of all the Creeds he thought the Athanasian most likely to be correct, because it made least compromise with popular demands. He was putting an important truth into a characteristic paradox. But from the philosopher's standpoint, what is most suggestive of all about the Creeds is not their changeableness. It is rather their tenacity. Think for a moment of the oldest among them which reached any elaborate or detailed statement. The Nicene Creed, says a piquant writer, is but the majority decision of a Committee which sat sixteen hundred years ago. What about the majority decisions of other committees of that date? How would they fare before the tribunal of modern thought? This one has strangely endured, so that even to-day no considerable branch of Christendom is ready to amend it, though it is strewn with implications which the progress of secular knowledge cannot countenance. What can that possibly mean but

this—that the element which gives its value to the Nicene Creed is independent of the elements which vitiate it, and yet that although it is independent, the task of separating and restating it in isolation is too hard to face? Such is the extraordinary intellectual impasse which makes this Creed so fascinating to the philosophic historian.

To specify only a few points in some of the later Confessions which have had the work of Nicæa as their basis:

There has been no effective revision of the Creeds since the Copernican astronomy, since the rise of historical and literary criticism, since the growth of modern social science, since the discoveries of comparative religion, not to speak of the vast upheaval of Darwinism. It has been the office of philosophy, at every turn in this long course of intellectual achievement, to point out how much in the ancient formulæ is no longer defensible, how much must at least be re-interpreted in what Creeds and Confessions have said about the structure of the universe, about the inerrancy of Scripture, about the functions of the civil magistrate, about the origin of man, and about the personal perils of doctrinal error. But when this duty of criticism has been fulfilled, those Creeds still stand, and hardly anyone will undertake to draft them anew. Other formulæ of bygone centuries attract the activity of innumerable draftsmen. But even the more audacious of religious critics for some cause avoid the responsibility of reshaping. What is the instinctive inhibition that warns them off? It is a philosophic problem of fascinating interest.

I think the cause is this. The critic is far from confident that he could redraw those Creeds without spoiling in the revision the very active principle that has given them their value. He could draft a new philosophy; that is being done all the time. But this is another matter. Amid the resemblances between a Creed and a philosophy there is this crucial difference. They are alike in trying to explain experience, but the Creed-makers were right in thinking they had a whole continent of experience to explain which to philosophers, as such, was unknown. It was the specific experience of the Christian consciousness, the new force which had been at work steadily for three centuries in the life of mankind. From the philosophic point of view, this was no more than a new set of opinions and feelings, somehow developed by an Eastern cult, curious no doubt like its predecessors, and destined to as short a speculative career. For the Creed-makers at Nicæa it was no such thing; it was a disclosure, a Divine manifestation in the

fulness of time, and it would yet attest itself, by its world-transforming power, as having no real kinship with a philosophic guess. To stop this threatened confusion of things so different, to rescue what they called 'the Deposit of Faith' that no one might mistake it for yet another fancy of the schools, this was the purpose of Creed-making. Now, which view of the significance of Christianity in the world has the record of sixteen centuries confirmed? To put such a question is to answer it. It is likewise to answer the question why the making to-day of a new Creed is a venture which very few are bold enough to face.

I said at the outset that philosopher and theologian have need to meet for discussion of their respective tasks. Not too often, lest each should compromise his independence, but also not too seldom, lest each should lose touch with a side of thought which he much requires to know. You will not misunderstand me if I add that they should meet with genuine, but not with excessive, mutual respect. The apostolic maxim that we should be able to admonish one another is a maxim to which, no doubt, some of us yield an all too facile obedience, but we can neglect it to our loss, and we have done this many a time in the relation of philosopher and theologian. History shows that they have been by turns afraid of each other, by turns forgetful that each has his own contribution to make, and will make it best if he is not too solicitous about the other's feelings.

Which of us, for example, would desire to restore the mediæval relation, the days of the *ancilla theologiæ*, when the philosophic teacher had to pause at every turn to take his theological bearings? When I think what philosophy suffered from that long servitude, and of the mark it so long carried even after it was set free, there comes back to my mind an old story from the *Dialogues* of Pope Gregory VII. It tells how Bishop Boniface, on one of his episcopal tours, had occasion to borrow a horse. They mounted him well, and his tour of visitation was completed; but, says the narrator, that horse was never quite the same afterwards; *post sessionem tanti pontificis*, after being sat upon by so great a pontiff. Something of the kind happened, I fear, to philosophy. It

too was sat upon, not by one great pontiff, but by many, in the ages that are past. It too was commandeered by Princes of the Church in their ecclesiastical emergency, to endorse the Faith and confute the heretic. Sometimes indeed, like Balaam, the philosophic seer distributed blessings and curses in other than the appointed direction. But on the whole, century after century, he was all too complaisant; and the recovery of independence was slow. The very nomenclature of the philosophic schools, their very language, not only in stating a solution but even in propounding a problem, was long eloquent of the alien service to which they had been bound.

But if it was the mediæval fault for philosophy to be over-deferential to theologians, I think it is the fault of our age for theologians to be over-deferential to philosophy. These recoils commonly proceed too far, and the balance is now tipped unfairly in a new direction. I wish someone would write a book, long since overdue, which should supplement the familiar record of what theology owes to philosophical criticism by the no less valuable record of what philosophy owes to theological steadfastness. I have in mind three major issues: mechanism or vitalism, finite personality, objective moral obligation. It is well known that on all these the tide of philosophic doctrine has shifted again and again. Can anyone doubt that it was the obstinate resistance of the Christian consciousness, the whole spiritual climate produced by the working of the Christian principle in the world's thought, that compelled philosophic analysis to go back again and again upon its own apparent results, saving it from conclusions which were seen to be dialectically invalid only after they had been first proved destructive of the eternal values?

There is no need, at this time of day, to press the need for free philosophic inquiry. But there is need for the Church to reflect that once again speculative interest may be conciliated at too high a cost. Be not over-ready, says Karl Barth, to baptize into the Faith, all unshriven, the last daring hypothesis of science. As of old, the Deposit of Faith is to be kept. In religion as in art, it is the critic who must wait upon the artist, not the artist on the critic.



## Gambling.

BY THE REVEREND H. S. MARSHALL, M.A., THE COLLEGE OF S. SAVIOUR, CARSHALTON, SURREY.

THE number of things we can assert to be wrong in themselves, always and under every conceivable circumstance, is comparatively small. There is all the difference in the world between saying a thing is normally to be avoided and saying it must be avoided under any and every conceivable circumstance. Yet because of the well-known tendency to exalt the exception above the norm and to suppose that it overthrows rather than supports the standard, many teachers are extremely chary of permitting any sort of exception to the rules of conduct. They fear for the standard itself.

The gambling fever is admittedly disastrous in its consequences to individuals, families, and society as a whole. One of these consequences can be observed at the present time as a drying-up of genuine charity, desiccated as it is by the prevalence of lotteries. Yet, as Dr. Kirk interestingly remarks,<sup>1</sup> the Church seldom or never prohibits any practice, however dangerous to the community, unless convinced of its immorality on other grounds. The traditional attitude of Moral Theology, as a matter of actual fact, has been to regard betting as a thing indifferent; to say that 'bets, gambling, and lotteries are not immoral *per se*,' and therefore, when not excessive, allowable. Thus the question is regarded as, like intemperance, a matter of degree. But, like intemperance too, betting and gambling are serious social evils. The problem, therefore, needs to be treated from two points of view—the intrinsic and the pragmatic. We need first to consider whether gambling is or is not a matter of degree, and then to consider it as a social evil.

The recognized forms of gambling are Betting, Gaming, and the Lottery; all of them variations of a contract depending upon incalculable factors. In betting, a wager is laid on or against some unknown contingency. In gaming, large or small sums of money are staked upon the result of a game. In lotteries, the purchase for a small sum of a chance to win a much larger (or its equivalent in goods) is made. But in each one the issue is more or less outside reason or calculation. Loss or gain is dependent upon the incalculable factor—chance.

If gambling is always and everywhere wrong in itself, no question arises as to whether, like hunger or amusement or alcohol, it is only wrong when

indulged in to excess. Men like Canon Peter Green and the late Archdeacon Charles hold that to decide the ownership of property by an appeal to chance cannot be other than an immoral action. Others, like Jeremy Taylor of old and Dr. Kirk to-day, would either distinguish between the degrees of the stake involved or otherwise modify the statement. The former, for example, distinguishes between the degree of the stake involved, that is, whether it is trifling or considerable. The latter maintains that as a generalization the statement is too sweeping and cannot be maintained, since it can easily be argued that we should then be none of us moral because civilized society is based upon an ebb and flow of money and goods determined in some degree by chance. This is well put by Jeremy Taylor. 'There is chance and contingency in all human affairs; in merchandise; in laying wagers; in all consultations and wars; in journeys and agriculture; in teaching and learning; in putting children to school or keeping them at home; in the price of the market; and in the vendibility of commodities.' In all human affairs there are factors unknown to us and unforeseeable by us. We are forced to take risks, even with our very lives. It is, therefore, far from easy to condemn as wrong every form of human activity dependent upon the element of chance. On the contrary, it is often this element—the risk—which raises an action and makes it exceptionally praiseworthy. We cannot condemn gambling solely on the ground of risk. Replying, too, to Canon Green's question, 'Does any man want his pretty daughter to marry a gambler?' Dr. Kirk<sup>2</sup> rightly points out the fallacy involved in the question, namely, that 'gambler' is used obviously of a person wholly devoted to backing horses or playing cards for high stakes, and that the question sounds rather absurd if it becomes the case of his pretty daughter marrying an eligible and comfortably situated husband who once a week played bridge at a club for sixpence a hundred. In trifling wagers or stakes such as a mild flutter on a horse race, at the Casino, or playing bridge for a few pence a hundred, or backing our opinion on some disputed point, the question of risk hardly comes in at all. It is so trifling as not to matter. But another basis for discussion is provided by those

<sup>1</sup> *Conscience and its Problems*, 296.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.* 307-312.

who defend such little peccadilloes. They assert they can be treated exactly as we treat the matter of paying for some entertainment. If a game of bridge, for example, costs us half a crown we pay up in exactly the same spirit as we pay half a crown for a seat in the theatre or the picture-house. This, however, ignores the other side of the argument, namely, that if we win we are in the position of some one who not only is treated to an entertainment but given a 'tip' at the end of it. The comparison between paying for an entertainment and paying *if we lose* at bridge does not really provide a true parallel. We know we shall not get in unless we pay for a seat beforehand in the case of the entertainment; while in the case of the game of cards not only are we not asked to pay beforehand but the entertainment may turn out to be free. We may even be paid for sitting it out. Alternatively, the plea is sometimes advanced that there can be no wrong in staking some small sum of money one can easily afford. To this the counter argument can be adduced that if one does not lose it but wins, the money may be *taken* from some one who cannot afford it, who may indeed be severely hurt by the loss. And if this is not the case, and one does lose, there are plenty of good causes. The money would be much better employed in helping them. Nor should it be forgotten that sums which to a particular company of bridge players are trifling sums, represent to those in dire need almost a fortune, so that if they can be so easily spared the better thing to do is to give them away to those in need. A measure which, in passing it may be said, would produce greater happiness than the pleasure of a game.

Trifling as stakes may be, they introduce an element to be found in all gambling whether for high prizes or low, a factor which provides a really solid basis for discussion. It is the covetous element in our nature. On this ground it seems possible to condemn all forms of gambling. Even in little gambles there is an appeal to the covetous in us which our Lord so consistently and so severely condemned. This would appear to be the ground chosen by Jeremy Taylor. 'He that means to make his games lawful must not play for money but for refreshment. This, though (it may be) few will believe, yet it is the most considerable thing to be amended in the games of civil and sober persons. For the gaining of money can have no influence into the game to make it the more recreative, unless covetousness hold the box. The recreation is to divert the mind or body from labours by attending to some-

thing that pleases and gives no trouble; now this is in the conduct of your game, in the managing a prosperous chance to advantage, and removing the unprosperous from detriment and loss of victory, but when money is at stake there is a wide door open to temptation, and a man cannot be indifferent to win or lose a great sum of money, though he can easily pretend it. If a man be willing or indifferent to lose his own money, and not at all desirous to get another's, to what purpose is it that he plays for it? If he be not indifferent, then he is covetous, or he is a fool; he covets that which is not his own, or unreasonably ventures that which is. If without the money he cannot mind his game, then the game is no divertisement, no recreation, but the money is all the sport, and therefore covetousness is all the design; but if he can be recreated by the game alone, the money does but change it from lawful to unlawful, and the man from being weary to become covetous.'

It seems to me Jeremy Taylor is right on this point. That if there is no eagerness to acquire, all forms of gambling lose their interest. There is no sense in making a bet or playing for a stake or entering for a lottery if one is strictly and truly indifferent as to the result. Consequently, as based upon the covetous instinct, gambling comes under the condemnation of our Lord, and for a Christian is wrong. It is, furthermore, an offence against charity, since it may involve the hurt or deprivation of one's neighbour. The winner wins at the expense of another—or a number of others. The loser pays (he does not give) under a compulsion that is certainly not love for his neighbour. Gambling would, therefore, appear to be in fact and always wrong *per se* because it is (a) motivated by covetousness, and (b) an offence against charity.

In its social aspect, one consideration very germane to the question as it affects certain classes of the community, is the inequitable distribution of property that leaves some with less than they actually require for subsistence. Those who possess very little indeed, whose life is a desperate struggle for survival, are fiercely tempted by the circumstances of their life to hazard a proportion of their meagre possessions in the hope of gaining more than by personal industry or thrift they could ever hope to acquire. The enormous return for a comparatively small stake; the dazzling prospect of complete freedom from financial anxiety and worry, effected by a merely temporary accentuation of their difficulties, presents itself with an alluring attractiveness almost impossible to resist, and equally unimaginable by the well-to-do. Herein



is to be found the real tragedy of many a home. Gambling by the poor and those who know themselves to be on a dead level of existence is overwhelmingly tragic. Who dares to censure when circumstances are thus? Over and over again the winning of a huge prize appears as the one and *only* way of escape. Not covetousness but desperation is the motive here. It does not condone the practice, but merely accentuates the evil. Seldom do the prizes go to the most deserving. The question of need operates not at all in their distribution. All is pure chance. But those who can least afford to lose are losers on the largest scale.

There is room in this for pity; a large-hearted pity. Censure must be reserved for the promoters of such concerns as promise tremendous rewards for comparatively insignificant stakes. Is any reprobation too severe for those who exploit the pressing need of thousands to their further and graver impoverishment? It is a cause of wonder how the winner feels about it when he reflects that a very considerable proportion of the money paid to him is veritably the life-blood of those who have been drained of it. But, no doubt, they do not think. The evil of sweepstakes, betting slips, and the like, a social evil of the first magnitude, therefore needs to be brought home to every one. It is a tragic evil when half the world is poverty-stricken. It is a moral evil in the light of its repercussion upon character.

As a practical measure (not with this end in view, but taking things as we find them) the remedy of a hair of the dog that bites us is sometimes rather attractive. The experiment of including in

huge organized sweepstakes some benefit to all whose income is below the poverty line, as well as the hospitals, might have interesting results. The plan would necessitate a scheme by which the beneficiaries received a much larger proportion of the sums subscribed than they do at present. But probably it is a remedy that is no remedy at all, but productive only of anthrax. In that case we have to look elsewhere.

And then, it would seem, the really important plan is to produce a widespread sense of shame. If promoters as well as winners could be shown the truth, if they could be made to realize the effect of organized gambling schemes upon those in dire poverty, they might indeed be roused to a sense of shame. If the Press, with all its enormous power, could change its tactics so as to give us the private and intimate details of the home life and general circumstances, not of the winners but of those who lose, some result might follow. A vivid and detailed account, culled by some experienced and up-to-date reporter from the home of an unemployed docker, describing his reaction to and future plans determined by, the news that he had drawn blank; photographs of himself and his surroundings; a supplementary interview with his wife; something of this sort, multiplied by as many skilled investigators as an important industry can supply, would do much to bring home to a wide public, large-hearted and generous as it is, something of the essential tragedy that lies behind this exploitation of suffering which is masquerading under the sacred name of charity. And it would, surely, fill promoters and winners alike with a sense of honest shame.

## In the Study.

### *Virginibus Puerisque.*

#### A New Gospel.

By THE REVEREND J. S. STEWART, B.D., ABERDEEN.

'The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life.'—Jn 6<sup>63</sup>.

QUITE recently there came from Egypt to the British Museum in London two torn bits of paper, centuries old. Experts have examined them, and have decided that the writing on them belongs to

a date not later than A.D. 150. But the really startling thing is that on both of these scraps of paper the name of Jesus occurs several times; and the writing, when deciphered, reads just like a passage from a Gospel. Only—this is the difficulty—it is not a passage that occurs in Matthew, Mark, Luke, or John. There are resemblances, but that is all. Now we know that once upon a time there were a good many more Gospels in existence than the four that have survived to us to-day. (If you want proof of this, read the first four verses of

Luke.) So it is more than likely that these two shabby and discoloured bits of paper, now reposing in the Museum in London, are a fragment of a lost Gospel; and what gives them their extraordinary value and importance is that they are of an earlier date than any manuscript of the New Testament ever yet discovered.

Is it not sad to reflect that hundreds and thousands of Jesus' words have been lost, and never recovered? Think of some of the glorious words that have survived—how much poorer we should have been without them! 'Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.' How many weary folk would have gone weary all their days, if they had never heard Jesus saying that! Or the story of the prodigal—how many sinners would never have dared to turn their faces home, if it had not been for that! Or the Sermon on the Mount—how much of our religion would have got on to the wrong track, if we had lost that! And yet—thousands of Jesus' sayings must have disappeared and left no record behind.

But now—think of the excitement there would be, if we read in our newspapers one morning that a hitherto unknown play by Shakespeare had been discovered! Think of the interest, if a new batch of Wordsworth's letters came to light! Think of the rush to buy volume three of the *Pilgrim's Progress* by Bunyan, if such a work were ever found! How much more exciting must it be to recover lost sayings of Jesus! For 'the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life.'

And yet, there is something better than unearthing buried words of Jesus from the past, and that is to hear Jesus speaking to-day. We sometimes feel like Matthew Arnold:

Oh, had I lived in that great day,  
How had its glory new  
Fill'd earth and heaven, and caught away  
My ravish'd spirit too!

It is not necessary. Richard le Gallienne heard mocking voices declaring that Christ was dead, and His day done, and His voice silent; but he was not perturbed at what they said:

I hear, and to myself I smile,  
For Christ talks with me all the while.

Better than any rediscovered sayings is the living voice that you yourself can hear.

Think, too, of this. Here is this old Gospel that has arrived at the British Museum—a mere fragment, torn and tattered, decipherable only with

the greatest difficulty. What about our hearts? What about Christ's gospel there? Is not the writing on our souls often defaced—spoilt by sin, torn by temptation, a mere fragment of what it might have been—so blurred that no one, looking at us, can read it?

But what gave the Museum scholars the clue was the name of Jesus on the manuscript. And if the name of Jesus is still there on our hearts, something can be made of us yet. Something of the message can shine through. And it may be that one day, if not here then hereafter, God Himself will find the lost bits, and piece together all the torn bits, and make our life—even ours—a complete and perfect gospel, to the praise and glory of His name.

### Temptation.

BY THE REVEREND T. GREENER GARDNER,  
MATLOCK.

'There hath no temptation taken you but . . . a way to escape.'—1 Co 10<sup>13</sup>.

One of the common sights in the country, especially in the summer, is to see numbers of people, dressed in a special dress, carrying a pack on their shoulders and trudging along the country roads. Sometimes you find people who look very happy and thoroughly enjoying the experience, and at other times you find some who look as if they were having a very bad time. We call these people 'hikers.' The Dictionary says 'hike' means 'to hoist, or shoulder,' and the description is true of a large number of them, for they shoulder their pack.

The other day I was at the railway station, and saw a notice which said: 'Special fares for hikers.' I stood and looked at the notice, and then I smiled, for I have met people who are all dressed up as hikers dress, looking the part, but doing the journey in a train. It is the easier way to do a journey, and they had 'special fares.'

They remind me of a hymn I heard sung when I was a boy, 'Should I be carried to the skies on flowery beds of ease?' I imagine that there are numbers of people who would like to go to heaven without having to meet trouble, but I am sure that, just as 'hikers' are walkers who shoulder their pack, so those who get to heaven must face up to the difficulties of life on the way, knowing that for every trial there is a way of escape. The way to overcome difficulties is to face up to them.

We are all fond of games in these days, and I like to watch boys play games. I watch them play cricket in summer, and football in the winter.



Recently I was watching a friendly match of cricket, and the boy who was bowling was sending down some very fast balls. The boy who was batting shouted out, 'Don't bowl so fast!' The bowler was a good-tempered boy, and so he sent down what might be called 'Googlies,' and after a couple of that sort, the batsman shouted again, 'And I don't want that sort, either.'

The few people who were looking on smiled, and the bowler continued to send his 'Googlies,' then one of the onlookers shouted, 'Go out and meet them'—and out went the boy and began to knock them about. 'Go out and meet them,' that is good advice when the troubles of life come—we do not solve our troubles by sitting still and requesting that we should be relieved from certain types of trouble, hoping that we might be carried to the skies on flowery beds of ease. Go out to meet the troubles and show yourself big enough to face up to difficulties.

The school near where I live play Rugby football in the winter, and some of the boys do very well at the game. There was one big boy who got quite a reputation for scoring tries. One day when he was in special form he got the ball and went off towards the line, evading the bigger boys, and keeping the smaller ones off with his long arms. He scored twice, and it looked as if, whenever he got the ball, he would be able to score, but the third time he was stopped by quite a small boy. Down the line the big fellow was going, when one of the masters shouted to a small boy: 'Tackle him, Jones, tackle him!' and Jones didn't stop to think how much smaller he was than the other boy, he simply took a flying leap and gripped the other boy around the legs, and down they came. Having done it once successfully, he tried again and again, and the debacle was stopped for that game.

Sometimes we are apt to accept some difficulties as too big for us to tackle, and we look on with fear. Well, there is a voice which is saying to us, 'Tackle your difficulties, for there is no trial but there is a way of escape,' and most often it is by tackling them. The Apostle Paul, who had told the Corinthian Church about trial and temptation and the way to meet it, had found his way of escape. He had taken Jesus Christ at His word, and found such leadership and such strength for the trials he had to meet that on one occasion he said, 'I am more than conqueror.' So if you will remember that you have Jesus on your side, you can, under His guidance, go out to meet your difficulties and tackle your troubles, and you may know just what

the Apostle Paul meant when he said he was 'more than conqueror.'

## The Christian Year.

### SECOND SUNDAY IN LENT.

#### The Eternal Will.

'For this is the will of God, even your sanctification.'  
—1 Th 4<sup>3</sup>.

Life at once begins to gain in content and volume when it acquires a distinct point of view. We believe, with Coleridge, that 'To him that knoweth not the port to which he is bound, no wind can be favourable; neither can he who has not yet determined at what mark he is to shoot, direct his arrow aright.'

This of course amounts to asking, 'What is the will of the world and of God—especially what is the will of God for us?' If there *is* a will expressed in this world, aided and buttressed by the obvious laws of life, then it will be only common sense for us to lay our course in line with it.

In his two Thessalonian Epistles, Paul is led to make a practical definition of the will of God as he understood it. By a displeasing chance, his earlier teaching had been much misinterpreted. He had preached powerfully, perhaps mistakenly, of Christ's second coming, but his readers had misunderstood his application and had begun to think that Christ would come immediately—to-day or to-morrow. Such an expectation led to all sorts of disorders. For instance, some argued that if Christ were to be expected on any day or at any hour, what good was there in working and slaving at ordinary toil? As a result, many unbalanced people broke away from the healthy restraint of work and duty.

And so here and later, beginning, as Jesus would, with all that he could find to commend, he passes to the hard side of his letter, the fault-finding. The test, he says, is, 'What is the will of God.' Forget for the moment all about Christ's coming, for after all that is in other hands. Think of what God's will in the present would be, *whether Christ came or not*. Is not the will of God that a man should live justly, quietly, soberly, and godly?

The argument is that the highest expression of the Will of God is that a man, by the leading and strengthening of the Holy Spirit, should gradually grow in likeness to Christ. That is the plain meaning of the word 'sanctification.'

It is the claim of the Apostle that this renewed

life is the direct will of God for every man. It might even be said that creation itself moves towards that. The Bible's outlook is that the world was made for man, and man was made for God: man is the fulfilment of creation, and God is the fulfilment of man. God has willed many things—we could name many—but He has willed nothing just so much as this, that man should seek Him and find Him and become like Him. It is an awful moment for us when we realize that *we* are the will of God, we are the objects of His planning, and His will is centred and pledged in the fact of our sanctification.

It is wonderful how akin that rich Bible doctrine is to the cream of modern thought. For a while it was imagined that the results of modern science and discovery were hostile to the accepted Christian position of man's supremacy as the goal and highest product of creation. It seemed at first as if modern thinkers were pulling man down from his pedestal, linking him on, in point of origin and nature, to the lower animals. But the tendency of thought to-day is not to detract from or depreciate man's position or nature, but to exalt them. Is there a thinker of any repute who would deny (even on the basis of man's lowest origin) that reasoning, self-conscious man is the finished product of creation, the goal of every evolving process—or that there can possibly be anything higher than the human spirit, or dearer than the human soul, or more precious than the good man who has imported God into his life? That is what the world groans and travails to produce. It is the apex of all creation.

It is not possible for us to conceive of anything greater than the perfect human soul, the soul made glorious in Jesus. Could God, such as we know Him, be as well pleased in anything as He was in Jesus, who was the perfect Son of Man, to whom we are called to approximate? 'This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.' There is nothing quite so great in this world as the thinking human mind, nothing quite so eternal as the human soul, nothing quite so much the will of God as our daily growth in sanctified living. Holiness is indeed the cream of creation, purity is the object of the universe. How this great doctrine should deepen the responsibility of our living, and link goodness to eternal foundations!

Let us now try to show what light is cast on two things by this conception of sanctification as the purpose of the world and the will of God.

1. The first of these is Jesus Himself and His mission. A common criticism is that of the man

who says that the means of salvation provided in Jesus is altogether out of proportion to the worth of mankind. The thing is the invention of a diseased religious egotism! Is it possible that God could narrow down His eternal will to such a paltry attempt? Can we and our affairs be of any intimate concern to Him whose power keeps the spheres in poise? 'What is man that thou art mindful of him?' But it all comes from a wrong point of view.

A speck of conscious life is worth millions of dead worlds. If there were no self-conscious life except on this earth, then, in spite of all solar systems, this planet would be the centre of the universe—man would make it so. Man is the highest expression of the will of God, the one thing for which all others exist.

If that be so (and it *is* so), if God's will be our sanctification at all costs, can one fail to see the natural place that the strange cross of Christ holds between God and man? It is no longer something to be surprised at, for who can be surprised at love? It is no longer a miracle. It is not even startling. It is just the natural outcome of God's passion to obtain that which He most desires, the sanctification of man. If we accept the evidence of our senses and the testimony of our spirits, we shall find it harder perhaps to disbelieve than to believe in the mission of Christ. If the will of God be really for goodness, we can understand Him doing anything to get it—*anything*. If the will of God be human perfection and sanctification, ought He not even to have given Himself to effect it? God so willed and desired the sanctification of mankind that He gave Himself in Jesus. Christ is only God's natural attempt to work out the one thing that He willed.

2. Again, this great doctrine of God's passion for our sanctification throws a needed light on another thing, one that is a source of common worry and restiveness. Who has not been puzzled by the mishaps, the ups and downs, the waywardness, the mysteries of joy or sorrow of which life is so full? Again and again, the best of us are puzzled how to square facts with theories, how to find a place in our faith for the cruel, bitter truths of actual living.

Here it is worth remembering that God's will was none of the things we think it should have been, but was purely a spiritual end, the evolving of tried, purified, tested, triumphant human souls. The test of usefulness to such sanctification is the only test by which we are entitled to try life—for that is the end of life.



Our sanctification and the will of God are one. We are false to God's purpose and our own destiny if we do not follow on to know Jesus. We fall short of life's aim and life's crown. It is a crown of which no one can rob us but ourselves, for we and the Holy Spirit conspire together for our growth in grace. Let that conspiracy begin to-day. Defeat not the will of God, frustrate not His grace; but by dying unto evil and living unto good, let us obey the will of God, even our sanctification. Beside that, nothing else counts.<sup>1</sup>

### THIRD SUNDAY IN LENT.

#### An Uncharted Journey.

'Ye have not passed this way heretofore.'—Jos 3<sup>d</sup>.

We must be willing to consider great problems from the Christian point of view, and deal briefly with three of them, as they are likely to meet us in conversation or in our reading. The three problems are: The social question, marriage and the family, and Christian belief.

1. Historically, it is quite untrue that Christ came to preach an economic revolution. The gospel is a message of spiritual redemption, not of social reform. Some of the Old Testament prophets plunged into the turbid waters of political agitation; Christ walked over them dryshod. He did not even discourage the apocalyptic dreams which meant so much to His disciples, and which almost destroyed their interest in the future of society. It is as vain to look in the Gospels for political guidance as it is to look in them for any idea of an institutional Church. We should perhaps have been glad to find such help in the Gospels, but it is not there. The plain truth is that our Lord was quite indifferent to all forms of government, ecclesiastical and civil; that He disclaimed any concern with questions of distribution; and that He despised all the paraphernalia of civilization, beyond the very simplest comforts and necessities.

The violent language often used about our industrial civilization is to be deprecated strongly—with all its faults it is so far the highest achievement of co-operative effort on a large scale. As Bishop Westcott said, 'the honourable purchaser and the honourable seller meet in business for the work of citizens. Their interest is the same—the right support of life.'

The best way of looking at our class struggles is that they are a scramble for the enormous unearned increment created, not by capital, nor by labour, but by the new machinery. It cannot be said

to belong to anybody, and that is why it is fought for, as two hives of bees will massacre each other for a lump of honey lying between them. The amount of this unearned wealth would be colossal if the possessors of it had not squandered most of it in fighting, a kind of folly which the Church has hitherto failed to stop.

Has Jesus Christ nothing to say to us as employers or employed? Whosoever will be chief among you, He said, let him be your servant, even as the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister. The Law of Service is the Christian Law; and it is a law which our generation is increasingly willing to accept. The word 'Service' may become unreal or wearisome; but it embodies the true message of Christ to the business world. Every one of us has to find out what God meant him to do with his life—in what way he may employ his five talents, or two, or one talent, best; and then he ought to choose that career, without thinking too much whether it is lucrative or not, and to put his best work into it, without thinking too much whether he is getting a full return for whatever he puts in.

Though the gospel refuses to give us any rulings about distribution, it has a great deal to teach us about consumption. The importance of right spending has been much underestimated by social reformers. If we thought more frequently what our money is worth in terms of human labour—if we remembered that to waste ten shillings is to waste, to render nugatory, a whole honest day's work by somebody or other, a great deal of vulgar and selfish expenditure would be stopped.

That which in our best moments we desire for ourselves—that our work shall be something which we feel to be worth doing—must also be our ideal for those who directly or indirectly work for us. We have no right to waste the honest work of anybody, and no right to set anybody to do for us work which it is degrading to a free man to have to do. This principle will carry us a long way.

2. We pass to the second group of problems, those connected with marriage and the family. Periods of Puritanism and of licence seem to alternate; we are now in a period of licence, in which the principles which have held society together since a time earlier than the dawn of history are too often set aside as irrational taboos. And yet no nation has ever prospered in which family life was not held sacred. Our imaginative literature is now deeply corrupted. There is nothing for which Englishmen have more reason to thank God than for the purity and wholesome-

<sup>1</sup> J. Black, *The Burthen of the Weeks*, 50.

ness of English fiction, from Sir Walter Scott to Anthony Trollope. It is true that the romantic movement exaggerated the part which sex plays in a normal human life; but it was a sublimated eroticism, purified and idealized. Now, in the new books which are being read to-day, the element of sex is much more exaggerated, and degraded to rank sensuality.

But these books are not a true picture of human life. The large majority of marriages are faithful and happy. A happy marriage is the best thing in human life, and it is within the reach of almost all of us. God is love; and the love of husband and wife brings us nearer to the heart of reality, the knowledge of God, than any other experience.

3. We come to the third and last of the three topics—the position of the Christian religion in the world of to-day, its message to the present generation, and its prospects for the future. Christianity, it may be, has reached the adult, no longer the adolescent, stage. The transition from authority to experience is in progress; the spiritual life, as Eucken is not tired of saying, is and must be autonomous, bearing with it its own credentials and its own progressive verification.

In holding this view of revelation as a progressive spiritual enlightenment we are not false to the history of Christianity. We look back to those very bold pioneers, St. Paul and the author of the Fourth Gospel, who surely, as compared with the Palestinian Church, were the progressives of their day. We think of Clement of Alexandria and his picture of the Christian 'Gnostic'—he is not yet afraid of the word; of the fruitful labours of the other Greek Fathers to interpret Christianity in the terms of the philosophy of their time; of the Aristotelianism and Platonism of St. Thomas Aquinas and the other great schoolmen; of the great German idealists and the independent work of British philosophers on the same lines.

We shall be false to the spirit of these pioneers if we take their results as final; it is their method, their confident faith, their intellectual honesty, their forward view, which we should take as our models.

The progressive forces in religion to-day come partly from the Renaissance tradition, partly from mystical experience, the religion of the inner light, and partly from the individualism, liberty and zeal for social reform which characterized the sectaries, those step-children of the Reformation, who obtained a short and troubled supremacy under Oliver Cromwell, and whose ideas are now very much in the ascendant.

There is nothing really new in the idea of a Church of the Spirit, which beckons us on by untried paths. It is an attempt to gather together and twine into one threefold cord, not to be quickly broken, three of the threads which can easily be traced throughout Church history.

First, there is the friendly understanding with Humanism and Science, which was broken off by the disastrous wars of religion, and has never been cemented again. We ought to recognize that the life of the Spirit is one, and that God is now revealing Himself by means of the astonishing discoveries which are being made every year in the natural order. We have much to learn from the scientific temper, pure, dry, and bracing, like mountain air. But the nature of God is admittedly reflected very imperfectly in the human mind. Why should we think that it is mirrored more completely in external nature? The throne of the Godhead, as was said fifteen hundred years ago, is the mind or spirit of man.

The Church of the Spirit must make friends with Humanism and Science. For the primary ground of its faith, it must rest on the second of the 'three threads,' on what it is the fashion to call 'religious experience,' but which our forefathers called 'the testimony of the Holy Spirit.' This means not only the life of prayer, though emphatically it does mean that; it means also that we must respect the conscience of our age when it acquits or condemns us for actions which ecclesiastical tradition perhaps judged rather differently. There are real changes in Christian ethics. We must not let it be said that the Church is reactionary in these matters. The Church is really in danger when its teaching causes a moral revolt in candid minds.

Lastly, we may learn from the despised sectaries of the seventeenth century, not only the duty of toleration, which we have assimilated already, but to throw aside all claims to a monopoly of grace for any institutional organization.

We cannot, however, remind ourselves too often, when we say, 'we walk by faith, not by sight,' that stress should be laid on the verb. Faith is a way of walking, not a way of talking, or, as Benjamin Whichcote put it, Christianity is a divine life, not a divine science. If we only talk, we shall very likely come to the conclusion that Christianity is played out. If we try to live in such a way that Christ would approve our life, we shall certainly not think that. 'Lord, to whom should we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life.' There are some permanent acquisitions of the human spirit,



from which it cannot go back, and of these the Christian revelation is the greatest. It is a principle of life, and it can therefore change, as only the permanent can change. But to us, as to past ages, it can be and will be the guiding light which we may follow over the uncharted country through which our path lies. But unless we follow the gleam we shall soon see it no longer. Faith begins as an act of will, 'the resolution to stand or fall by the noblest hypothesis.' 'Who chooseth me must give and hazard all he hath.' Explain it how we will, that is the condition of spiritual vision. It makes the popular talk about the decay of Christianity sound very trivial.

It was a saying of Renan, which proves the fundamental frivolity of his outlook upon life, that in order to understand a religion one ought to have believed, and then to have ceased to believe in it. Far truer are the words of Otto: 'He who professes to stand outside religion, and to view all the religions of the world in impartial detachment, will never understand any of them.' Christianity can only be understood from inside; and those who are inside know Him in whom they have believed. 'I am persuaded,' says St. Paul, 'that neither death nor life, nor height nor depth, nor any other creature, can separate us from the love of God which is through Christ Jesus our Lord.'<sup>1</sup>

#### FOURTH SUNDAY IN LENT.

##### The Miracles that did not happen.

'He himself knew what he would do.'—Jn 6<sup>6</sup>.

'He could there do no mighty work.'—Mk 6<sup>6</sup>.

'How often would I have gathered thy children together . . . and ye would not!'—Mt 23<sup>37</sup>.

1. From the records of Christ's life there blaze forth again and again, with arresting brightness, simple but convincing accounts of altogether miraculous doings. Nothing is more impressive than the fact that He performed these miracles quite naturally, in no sense theatrically. He had no purpose of attracting attention to Himself; as witness, indeed, His prohibition of any report in respect of some of His most beneficent works. He did not even seek by means of miracle to confirm before an unbelieving world His declared relationship with God. His aim was plainly rather to help men realize that God was in the midst of their human lives. He sought to make it plain to them that His power was available for the relief of their necessities. He laboured to

convince them that the material is never the true nor the final value in any issue. The miracles of Jesus were just effective ways of showing God to men in relationship to their common and recurrent needs, to their hunger and sickness, their fears and strengthlessness, their defilement and despair. And they served, as nothing else could have done, to make God a really felt and calculable presence in the home, the Temple, the countryside, the city, on the sea, in every variety of circumstance and emergency. And that to every class in the community, alike to the rich, the poor, the young, the strong and vigorous, the convention-bound, the sorrow-stricken, the fear-haunted. It was His aim to convince men that they lived in a heaven-invaded world; in other words, that they could actually count on God. He summoned them to that higher allegiance in which they would find not only rest unto their souls, but a vocation also worthy of the inherent possibilities of lives created and capacitated for His glory.

But impressive as Christ's miracles are, it is a matter of conjecture, not of irreverent curiosity but of reverent adoration, as to whether the miracles He did not do—of which in the Gospels there are hints and even more than hints—because the human conditions of reception were not fulfilled, would not have gone far beyond anything He actually did.

The point of this reflection is that if He was hindered then it is possible He may be hindered now.

Let us have no uncertainty about this. It is only the Christ of miraculous power who is adequate to meet our moral and spiritual need. We may have succeeded, in this enlightened age of ours, in dispelling from our minds many of the shadows of ancient superstitions. And that is a gain. Are we so sure that in accomplishing this we have not also sacrificed the desirable sense of mystery and miracle? It is all to the good that we should be emancipated from the bondage of every misdirected loyalty. But the loss of awe, of reverence, of faith in the God whom Christ revealed, is very far from good. It was the glory of His earliest followers that having nothing they yet possessed all things. It is too often our shame that having all things we yet possess nothing.

2. There is much to search us in even the merest consideration of those occasions, as recorded in the Gospels, when He to whom all power was committed was halted in His beneficent intention by causes which even He could not overcome, except by invading the realm of human will and thus

<sup>1</sup> W. R. Inge, *The Gate of Life*, 40.

denying that respect for individual personality which was part of the impulse of His redemptive mission.

There had gathered to Him, drawn alike by His personality and His message from their ordinary interests, a great crowd in a desert place. As evening drew on the spell-bound people still lingered. And it became evident that they must either be summarily dismissed to their homes or some provision for their material needs must be supplied.

What He did was, of course, an amazing and unprecedented thing. Yet one cannot resist the thought that what happened was obviously not what He first had in mind. Great as was the miracle wrought on the hillside that evening, there was possibly a greater lying in the womb of His purpose. But it never came to birth.

Another instance of the same kind happened at Nazareth on His return there after the first announcements of His mission and demonstrations of His power in other parts of the country. Amongst His own folk He could do no mighty works, no miracles, because of their unbelief.

Toward the end of His brief public life, when the shadow of the Cross already rested upon Him, He uttered what are perhaps the most poignant words which ever fell from His lips. 'Oh, Jerusalem, Jerusalem . . . how often would I have gathered thy children together as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wing, and ye would not.' What a miracle He evidently had in mind had the city's attitude toward Him not been alternatively indifferent and angrily hostile! By what means could He have changed the current of Jerusalem's life to direct it God-ward and peace-ward? This He did not say. Yet, looking back upon the life by which His words are interpreted, we know that if Jerusalem had but listened to Him He held the secret which would have ended all its woes, its strife, its sin.

3. What does all this mean to us? What have these records of the might-have-beens of Christ's day to say to our generation? Just this. His power is not exhausted by His earthly record. He is 'the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever.' And, if we will, He can do in these our lives, to whatever level of moral unimportance they may have declined, the unprecedented miracle. Perhaps the greatest miracle of all those that did not happen in the days when Jesus was here among men was that to which we have already indirectly referred—the breaking down of the human will in order to create for Himself the moral co-operation

necessary to the liberation of Divine power. Nor in this respect has He changed.

Come, come to His feet; and lay open your story  
Of sorrow and suffering, of sin and of shame;  
For the pardon of sin is the crown of His glory,  
And the joy of our Lord to be true to His Name!

If we do so we shall then go out into the world under an adequate constraint, no longer wandering casually and aimlessly among the moral obligations of life, but determinedly taking the high road of discipleship and service with the urge of an indubitable experience of His abiding companionship and control.<sup>1</sup>

#### PASSION SUNDAY.

##### How Christ prepared Himself to die.

'Who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross, despising the shame, and is set down at the right hand of the throne of God.'—Heb 12<sup>1</sup>.

We must not hesitate to take these words as meaning precisely what they say. They tell us that the deep motive of our Lord's suffering, the thing which carried Him through the desolateness of Gethsemane and Calvary, was the joy of a prospect that lay on the other side. For a long time now, we have rather shrunk from attributing to Jesus any such motive or emotion. We have allowed ourselves to suppose that somehow it would be more worthy of Jesus to say of Him that He endured the suffering of life and the agony of death out of a sheer sense of duty, not permitting Himself at any moment the alleviation of a prospect. In this way, without intending any such thing, we have really brought about our own minds the same evils as have come upon the Church as often as it has laid the emphasis exclusively upon the deity and unintelligibility of Christ's experience, passing over too lightly, or neglecting entirely, the rich and human aspects. We must not hesitate to affirm that anything which makes the experience of our Lord unintelligible is something which He Himself would not approve.

Now we know how much it helps us—and this not in our worst hours, but in our best hours—to be able to look forward and to foresee the day when we shall be able to lift up our heads and look round about us in peace. And it is to make our Lord not divine at all, but merely inhuman, to suppose that He did not share with us this human and tender necessity. For far too long now, we have been speaking as though our Lord was a sad victim of life. The New Testament is against that view.

<sup>1</sup> J. S. Holden, *A Voice for God*, 47.



On the way to Calvary when the Cross was making Him stoop, the women who beheld Him could not keep back their tears ; but He, wishing to comfort them, and also to correct their superficial estimate of what was passing in His soul, said, ' Daughters of Jerusalem, weep not for me, but weep for yourselves.' It is the language of one who is far more vividly aware of the glory of His position than of the pain of it.

We think far too little of our Lord from that point of view. We think of Him as depressed, as defeated, and—this in spite of all our protests—as sad. We think of Him as if it had pleased God to deprive Him of that irreducible minimum of the spirit which we call hope. By doing this, we separate our Lord from all the brave souls that went before Him, and from all the brave souls that have come after Him. For through all the ages the great sufferers have had ' meat to eat that the world knew not of.' It would work something not short of a revolution in our whole religious life, if we could believe what the New Testament appeals to us to believe, what Christ repeatedly in set words asks us to believe, that for those like Himself in the matter of fidelity, for those who take His way, though life may do to them what life did to Him, it is all worth while ; it is cheap at the cost.

It is because we have not this New Testament and Christian way of considering our Lord's Passion, that we have all fallen into the sad way of considering death amongst ourselves, even when it comes most beautifully. Indeed, in our sadness, we are accusing ourselves of having nothing in our lives so beautiful and good that it would be a fine thing for us were God to call us to show our love for the beautiful thing by laying down our life for it.

This verse of Scripture, occurring where it does, fortifies us in the view we take of the spirit of it. Strictly speaking, it forms the close of the eleventh chapter. And what is the subject of that chapter but an appeal, to every one who believes in God, and in God as we know Him, to bear with great happiness such sorrows as life may involve us in ; that far from thinking ourselves forsaken or ill-used or defeated by the world, we are to think of ourselves as of the great company of those who in every age and through all the ages have kept God's flag flying in this universe ; and that all such fidelity can never be in vain !

All faithful souls, indeed, are invited to believe that their fidelity has joined itself to the fidelity of the Son of God ; that it is God's generous way of looking at things to see all our human fidelities within the fidelity of Christ ; and that we who

have shared our Master's human experience will share His everlasting glory—' who for the joy that was set before us, endured.'

One can see what it is we were contending for when we rather shrank from saying that our Lord endured for the sake of some joy which lay in front of Him. We were wishing, and quite rightly, to defend the purity of our Lord's achievement from the imputation of merely worldly rewards or dreams. The joy which Christ saw before Him was a real thing ; but that is not to say that it was anything material. We need not mean that it helped our Lord through His Passion to look forward to a day when that Passion would be completed. The joy that He anticipated was not merely or not at all the joy of a change or a reward. Why should we not believe that our Lord foresaw what was coming to Him ? Indeed, we know that He did foresee it. In so many words, He declared to His disciples that if He laid down His life in love for man, the human heart would never be able to forget Him, or to forget Him for long ; and that the human heart which did forget Him for a time, would come back to Him with the greater passion because of the interval of distance and forgetting.

And so, why should we not believe that the thought in our Lord's mind which the writer here describes as ' a joy that was set before him ' was just this : that our Lord foresaw that through all the ages the human heart would turn to Him.

Let us feel how idle, how trifling, how destitute of any token of immortality, is any life lived here in this world which has *not* at its heart communion with that victorious Passion of the Son of Man.

The meaning of Christ's suffering and death which the Holy Spirit would bring home to us one by one is this : that we do wrong to think of it all in a sad or disheartened way ; that we do wrong to think of it as a triumph for the world. We do wrong to think of our Lord as merely a victim of the world. Rather are we to see in it all the supremacy of spirit, the greatness of love, the excellence of fidelity, the reality of God.<sup>1</sup>

#### PALM SUNDAY.

##### The Glory of the Cross.

BY THE REVEREND W. ERNEST BEET, D.LITT., HYTHE.

' But God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ.'—Gal 6<sup>14</sup>.

So said St. Paul ; and his words are familiar enough to all of us, and do not strike upon our

<sup>1</sup> J. A. Hutton, ' *There they Crucified Him,*' 1.

ears with any sense of strangeness. This, however, was far enough from being the case in the ears of the overwhelming majority of the contemporaries of the Great Apostle, Jew and Gentile alike. Nay more, to speak of glorying, or exulting in the Cross was to use an expression practically indistinguishable from a contradiction in terms.

It is perhaps a little difficult for us to realize the peculiar detestation and horror with which the Cross was regarded throughout the Roman world. It was not that the death on the Cross was one of exquisite agony, for there were other forms of death indescribably excruciating; it was rather in the idea which it expressed, whence the Crucified was considered to have sounded the very lowest deep of degradation possible to human kind, a veritable abyss of infamy and shame. As vermin was nailed to a barn door as an object-lesson to which other vermin would do well to give heed, so human vermin was conceived of as being nailed up between earth and heaven, to scream and pray, perhaps for days, before a gaping crowd, for death to come and give release from agony beyond all bearing—a warning to his moral kin among the lookers-on to consider their ways and be wise. It was no feeling of humanity which induced Rome to exempt her own citizens from the death of the Cross; it was simply one of self-respect. However criminal a citizen might be, his citizenship saved him, not from suffering—he might be made to feel in other ways—but from the degradation of the Cross. St. Paul's great outburst thus presented a supreme paradox to the men and women of his own time.

In view of contemporary feeling with regard to it, it was a masterpiece of human policy on the part of Annas and Caiaphas and those who acted with them that they were able so to contrive matters as to bring the object of their hatred, hatred not untouched with fear, to the Cross. It promised to be, from their point of view, a completely satisfactory end of the whole business. It was not merely that they had killed Jesus; but, as no doubt appeared to them to be the case, they had absolutely made an end of Him and all for which He stood. By contact with the Cross He seemed to have passed beyond pity, and beneath contempt; and no one would ever dare to breathe again the dishonoured name of the Crucified. Overwhelmed with utter shame, He had disappeared into forgetfulness, the outer dark of complete oblivion. So the victors of the moment flattered themselves.

The phrase 'irony of history' is not unfrequently met with, for history has many ironies to show.

But among them all there is not a single one so absolute as that presented by the contrast between the intended and the actual result of the Crucifixion, between the anticipation of the enemies of the Divine Victim, and what, in fact, eventually took place. Christ was brought into contact with the Cross; but that contact did not work according to plan. The shame of the Cross was for ever shamed away; for the Cross did not avail to drag Christ down, while He availed to lift it up from the abyss of degradation and contempt to a place supreme among all the symbols of love and honour known to man. So far from its infecting Him with dishonour, He set it ablaze with His own glory, and exalting it to heaven, firm fixed it as a shining beacon light of hope and a promise of victory for all the aftertime.

Evidence of the place held by the Cross in the heart and thought of mankind may be gathered on every hand. In the quiet Gardens of Sleep, where rest those whom we love, but who are with us no longer, among the memorial signs which affection has erected to mark their last earthly home, the sign of the Cross is easily supreme. The badge which indicates the mission of mercy of those whose kindly task it is to salve the wreckage of the battlefield or some great upheaval of Nature is the same familiar symbol. The stars which glitter on the breasts of Kings, and which the most exalted and worthy are proud to wear, often as the reward of valuable public service, various in form as they may be, are after all but elaborations of the sign of the Cross. The insignia of the knightly orders which non-Christian courts have adopted from Christendom, though sometimes in disguised form, pay their unwitting homage to the Cross. This is suggestive enough, as a reminder that, whether men recognize the fact or not, the honourable and kindly associations which the Cross, in its almost bewildering variety of forms, has taken to itself in the modern world, is simply and solely due to the fact that Christ was crucified, and affords an amazing illustration of His transforming power. This result, when contrasted with the intention of the doers of the deed, as already pointed out, reveals the irony of history raised to the highest power.

Many of us have stood at the foot of Ludgate Hill and have seen glittering in the blue, as though raised aloft in the hand of some giant angel, the golden cross of St. Paul's. It may be we have watched the shadows lengthen, and have seen them fall upon the buildings beneath. That lengthening shadow is in some sort a parable, a



reminder that at dawn and sunset, at the beginning and at the end of the day, there rests upon the very heart of the greatest city in the world the shadow of the Cross—and the same is true of practically every great city in Christendom. The Crucified verily brought the designs of His would-be confusers to confusion, laying His hand upon the intended instrument of His degradation He lifted it up to a place of honour far above that occupied by any other symbol known to man. It soars high above our cities, its shadow rests upon our streets, upon our places of business and our

homes; all-pervasive, it enters into the lives and relationships of men, even though they know it not. Paul's paradox is a paradox no longer, but a statement of sober truth, which we to-day take upon our lips with proud affection, and with the prayer that not his opening words alone but the complete utterance of the Great Apostle may be, in ever-growing measure, the expression of our own personal experience: 'But God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, whereby the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world.'

## Repentance—Metanoia.

BY F. P. SHIPHAM, M.A., HOVE.

COLERIDGE, de Quincey, and Matthew Arnold all maintain that 'repentance' and 'repent' are mistranslations of 'metanoia' and 'metanoieite.' They are quoted by an American writer in a book he published in 1896, entitled *The Great Meaning of Metanoia: An Undeveloped Chapter in the Life and Teaching of Christ*, to which I am greatly indebted for facts and thoughts embodied in this note.

De Quincey, it appears, 'was irritated by the entire irrelevance of the English word, and by something very like cant,' in the word 'repent,' and insisted that 'metanoia' . . . bore *no allusion* to any ideas whatever of 'repentance.' The idea of 'metanoia,' he continues, was made to bear 'simply upon the noetic or intellectual faculty.' John the Baptist appealing to the noetic faculty! Saying to publicans, soldiers, and common folk, who confessed their sins, and to the 'offspring of vipers' who didn't, 'change your minds, get a new outlook, and bring forth fruits worthy of a new outlook'! The reference in de Quincey is found in the *Autobiographical Sketches*, vol. i. p. 434.

Matthew Arnold also suggests that 'repentance' is a mistranslation of 'metanoia.' 'Of metanoia,' he says, 'according to the meaning of Jesus, the lamenting one's sins was a small part; the main part was something far more active and fruitful, the setting of an immense *new inward movement* for obtaining one's rule of life. And metanoia, accordingly, is:—a change of the inner man.'

Jesus, Matthew Arnold said, was above the heads of His reporters; but that does not justify Matthew

Arnold in raising the reporters' words to the level which the reporters failed to reach.

The etymology of the Greek word has a peculiar fascination, for which some cause must be sought. Even Coleridge suggested that the literal meaning was the essential meaning, and suggested 'transmutation' as an equivalent.

Dr. R. F. Horton in his book on *The Commandments of Jesus*, writes, 'the simple meaning of "metanoia," which is rendered "Repentance," is afterthought or change of purpose. And the essential idea is a reconsideration of facts.'

Repentance becomes still less sorrowful, if regarded as an after-thought, an oversight, or a forgotten factor.

By making reconsideration of facts the essential idea, Dr. Horton isolates, and thereby magnifies, the intellectual faculty and minimizes, if not eliminates, the moral. Where are the flashes of conscience in hearts little aware of any reconsideration of facts, only too well aware of no need to reconsider, of no need but to repent?

*Peccavi nimis cogitatione, verbo, et opere; mea culpa, mea ipsius culpa, mea maxima culpa.*

Reconsideration of facts may in these days be more potent for amendment of life than repentance. Let the prophets decide. The linguist considers, not the reality of repentance, but the history of the word, its meaning throughout the ages; and if he looks for an alternative single word might approximate not with 'reconsideration,' but with 'surrender.'

Let the ear try the various renderings of the words of Christ in Mk 1<sup>15</sup>: 'The kingdom of God is at hand; *reconsider* and believe the gospel.' 'The kyngdome of God is at hande; *Amende* youre selves and beleve the gospel' (Coverdale). 'The kingdom of God is at hand; *surrender*, and believe the gospel.'

Then feeling that half a loaf is tantalizing, if you believe that the whole is offered, you will revert to: 'The kingdom of God is at hand; *repent*, and believe the gospel.'

Dr. Dearmer in his book, *The Sin Obsession*, writes as follows: 'Jesus did not go about telling people they were sinners, like a mission preacher of the old type, to terrify them into conversion. He told them "good news," heralded a kingdom on earth which needed (for this is the meaning of the Greek word we translate as repentance) a "turning" from darkness to the light.'

The use of inverted commas indicates that 'turning,' in Dr. Dearmer's judgment, is an adequate equivalent for the literal meaning of *metanoia*. At the utmost it is a metaphorical equivalent for *meta*. It is implied also that Jesus actually used a word or phrase for which a correct rendering is 'turn from darkness to light.' Dr. Dearmer's general conclusion about the teaching of Jesus may be right, but this way of supporting the conclusion is wrong.

From Canon Dearmer and Dr. Horton let us go back to Luther and Melancthon. Luther was puzzled by the expression which the Vulgate uses—*poenitentiam agere*. Did Christ really bid men do penance? Melancthon dispelled his perplexity by 'showing to Luther that "*metanoia*" . . . really and etymologically meant "change your mind."' From that moment the Reformation entered into a conscious alliance with the New Learning (W. Robertson Smith, *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, Lect. II.).

It was a sort of *metanoia* in the Protestants, a change of mind in the Reformers, that evoked a change in translation. Contemporary versions of the Bible illustrate the revolt against penance. Wycliff had almost always translated the '*poenitentiam*' and '*agere poenitentiam*' of the Vulgate by 'penaunce' and 'do penaunce.' The Rheims version followed Wycliff and, *mirabile dictu*, so did Luther, with 'thut Busse.' Tyndale and other EVV. almost always translated by 'repent' and 'repentance.' The Geneva version frequently has 'amend your lives' and 'amendment of life.' Coverdale varies: '*Amende your selves* and beleve the gospel' (Mk 1<sup>15</sup>); 'the cities . . . amended

not' but 'Tyre and Sidon had *repented* long ago' (Mt 11<sup>21</sup>). '*Do penaunce* . . . and turne you' (Ac 3<sup>19</sup>). The A.V. also gives an alternative, in the margin, of the Baptist's command, 'Bring forth therefore fruits *answerable* to amendment of life'

Beza, in his Latin version, got his composition of '*metanoia*' wrong, and made it '*meta*' and '*anoia*,' so as to signify 'a change from want of mind—from folly,' and rendered it '*resipiscentia*'—a return to wisdom.

'*Agere poenitentiam*' in the sixteenth century had indeed all the significance of 'do penance,' and all the associations of confession, absolution, and penance. But 'to do thanks' is not a proper translation of '*agere gratias*,' nor 'to do life' of '*agere vitam*,' nor 'to do penance' of '*agere poenitentiam*.' The meaning of this last is to *experience regret or shame*.<sup>1</sup> We find the term with this obvious meaning in writers of the first century A.D., in Pliny; in the *Dialogi de Oratoribus* ascribed to Tacitus; and in the *Satiricon* of Petronius. These writers were ignorant of penance, and the last of them was innocent of repentance.

'To do penance,' then, is not a proper translation of '*agere poenitentiam*,' as found in the Old Latin versions. Jerome never meant to represent Christ as saying of Tyre and Sidon that 'they would have done penance long ago,' nor of an offending brother, 'if thy brother do penance, forgive him.'

The obvious derivation of '*metanoia*,' however, was a handy weapon. If the meaning of '*nous*' is known, and the force of '*meta*' in composition, then certainly '*metanoia*' literally denotes some change of mind. And if it can be proved that John the Baptist, and Jesus Christ and St. Paul, and those who listened to them, took that as the full or essential meaning of the word, then the weapon has been effective.

But '*Theologia etymologica non est argumentativa*.' Theology does not grow from Greek roots. '*Metanoia*' is a translation of an Aramaic word, and represents an idea peculiarly Jewish. Repentance implies a sense of sin. No sin, no repentance. And notwithstanding the ideas of some Greek poets and philosophers, the Greek race was not oppressed with a sense of sin.<sup>2</sup> The meaning of '*metanoia*' depends

<sup>1</sup> So also *Actiones Fidei, Spei, Amoris*—'Acts' of Faith, Hope, Love—are not actions, but utterances—in devotional exercises.

<sup>2</sup> 'Greek teaching about sin had been concerned entirely with outward actions, not with motives. That meant that there was little distinction between sin and mistakes' (*How to understand Philosophy*, p. 18, by A. E. Baker).



on the context, on the speaker and the hearer, on the writer and the reader. The context in the N.T. was not the context in Classical Greek. This de Quincey and Matthew Arnold ignored.

Neither was sufficient allowance made for the liability to change, to which all words are exposed. The particular change from 'change of mind' to 'repentance' is a transition from cause to consequence. The consequence, repentance, in course of time got the name of the cause, which was some change of mind.

We have a sequence of three conditions—change of mind, repentance, amendment of life; three distinct conditions, the first and the second connected as antecedent and consequent, the second and third connected as antecedent and consequent. Those who accept the translation 'change of mind' are losing the consequent (repentance); those who favour the translation 'amendment of life' are losing the antecedent (repentance). Both are losing sight of the middle condition, that sorrow for sin, which is called 'repentance.'

The dissatisfaction with 'repentance,' which sprang from dissatisfaction with confession, absolution and penance will be mitigated if the dissatisfied can accept the derivation given by Max Müller in *Chips from a German Workshop*, vol. iv. "'Poena,'" he says, 'is punishment as a purification for sin.' The root is 'pu' meaning 'pure.' He quotes from the Atharva-veda: '*Tuam punihi duritaim asmat*' ('Do thou purify us from all misdeeds').

This etymology, however, is not established, and its attractiveness must not secure its acceptance. It is attractive because it brings pain and punishment, penance, and purgatory into the good company of words which reveal punishment as not vindictive, but remedial—chastening and chastisement and castigation, correction and 'instruction.'

'Behold, happy is the man whom God correcteth.'

'Therefore despise not thou the chastening of the Almighty' (Job 5<sup>17</sup>).

St. Paul speaks of being 'chastened and not killed' (2 Co 6<sup>9</sup>)—'*paideuomenoi*,' 'instructed or educated.'

If 'repentance' cannot have the freedom of this company, there is some little consolation in the prefix, which has reference to the past, suggesting revision or reversion, ideas cognate with 'change of mind.'

If, however, all the consolations of etymology are denied, the loss is bearable. It is perfectly well understood, in the world of religion, that repentance includes a change of mind. Take, for example,

the Collect of Ash Wednesday: 'Create and make in us new and contrite hearts, that we worthily lamenting our sins . . . may obtain forgiveness.'

But 'change of heart' is no more a proper translation of '*metanoia*' than is 'forgiveness.' Words are what they are. The universe of words must be accepted, along with the whole universe. One cannot better a chain by intussusception of links, nor an expression by fusion of inter-related terms. True, the conditions may be collateral. There may be fusion of processes, mutual or spiritual; in the individual—the undivided and indivisible personality; or in one corporate body or society.

The usual order even in the spiritual process may be reversed. A man may adopt Christianity as a working hypothesis, and finding that it works may arrive at a conviction of its truth.

'Any one who chooses to do his will shall understand whether my teaching comes from God or whether I am speaking on my own authority' (Jn 7<sup>17</sup>). Then may follow a conviction and horror of sin. The sequence now is conduct, change of mind, repentance.

Part of this sequence, or the whole, was in the mind of Pascal, when he said, 'Begin by taking Holy water, and you will end by becoming a believer.' But Pascal did not imply that 'holy water' and 'belief' were synonymous terms.

Divines and psychologists may consider the process and sequence. It is for the linguist to ask them to observe the distinction of terms.

This distinction the Reformers did in the main observe. But they seized with avidity on the literal meaning of '*metanoia*' to support their protest against absolution and penance, without, however, wishing to weaken the sense of sin, the necessity for repentance, and the need of redemption.

Modern writers, de Quincey, Matthew Arnold, and Canon Dearmer seize on the literal meaning to support their protest against repentance and the sin-obsession. Their aim is to eliminate the emotional and mystical element in the associations of repentance and to substitute for conviction of sin the belief that you have made a mistake. Repentance springs from that belief, but that belief, 'touched with emotion,' may be charged with passion. You cannot separate the intellectual from the moral faculties of the mind.

As a friend writes to me, 'we have probably all of us regretted with passionate intensity mistakes in our lives of which we could not say whether they were intellectual or moral.' A tangled web we

weave—errors of judgment and perversions of will. Those who feel like this do more than reconsider, more than change their point of view, and look at things from a different angle—they repent, μετανοοῦσιν.

In one passage in the N.T., Heb 12<sup>17</sup>, *metanoia* does appear to mean 'changing one's mind,' not merely 'altering one's opinion,' but 'reversing one's decision.' Esau 'found no place of *metanoia*.' Whilst the A.V. and R.V. give 'he found no place

of repentance,' the A.V. m. is 'he found no way to change his mind'; and Westcott in his note on the passage says that 'a place of repentance' is 'an opportunity of changing a former decision' so as, he adds, to terminate its consequences. If this is so, the A.V. and R.V. are inadequate and misleading, for this meaning does not derive from the etymology of 'repentance,' but from the literal meaning of *metanoia*, to which the learned and precise writer would thus be reverting.

## Recent Foreign Theology.

### Naria.

THE French saying *Qui s'excuse s'accuse* applies to the 'German Christian' party which now dominates the Evangelical Church of Germany. It is not only on its defensive; it is even assuming the offensive against the Christian churches of other lands in their almost universal condemnation of the policy of tyranny which this party is pursuing, and which, despite the recent humiliation of its leader by Herr Hitler, it seems determined so far as it can get the support of the State, still to pursue. The author of this pamphlet<sup>1</sup> of forty-eight pages is one of the ablest of the officials whom the Reichsbishop Müller has gathered around him; and he has been in Great Britain at least twice to try and secure a conciliatory attitude to the Reichsbishop's rule, but, to judge from the tone of irritation of this writing, is fully conscious of failure. There is no 'sweet reasonableness' about his argument, but defiance as well as defence.

In his first chapter he describes the present situation in Germany and the challenge which it offers to the Church. The national revolution demands corresponding changes in the Church. He maintains in his second chapter that the theology of his party is a return to the theology of the Reformation, to the revelation of God in Christ, to justification by faith as the cardinal doctrine, in opposition to a human religion, such as had prevailed in Germany, and such as he charges the churches of other lands as still favouring.

<sup>1</sup> *Die evangelische Kirche im neuen Reich*, von Oberkirchenrat Dr. theol. Friedrich Wilhelm Krummacher (Callweg, München; 90 pfg.).

The problem to be solved to-day must be stated in his own words: 'The church of faith is no idea, but a reality. This reality becomes historically manifest as alive only in the institution of the earthly church, which even as a part of earthly history also bears in itself the burden and guilt and fragility of everything earthly, and which if it deserves to be at all active, must also enter into history, and must, therefore, be hospitable to the current peculiarity of the people, the race, the period of time, and the problems of the time' (p. 17). What the last clause means is the now well-known principle of *Gleichschaltung*, conformity of State and Church, one race, one nation, one 'reich,' one leader, one policy. It would seem that this unity is to be established in the Church as in the State by force.

The third chapter seeks to justify the Church order which is being enforced in Germany by this evangelical faith. In its outward organization the Church belongs to the earthly order in history, based on the creative will of God, and so is subject to the State, and the State is entitled in restraint of sin, to use force. This, in brief, is the argument. The history of the relation of Church and State in Germany is given in the fourth chapter in order to show that the present situation demands that the relation of Church and State should be anchored in the relation of the Church to the people, for God's call is not to the individual only, but to the peoples. 'An evangelical church, the crucial centre of which is justification by the sole effective grace of God, cannot without denial of this faith in justification isolate itself. The faith in justification also forbids to the individual member of the church the possibility to separate himself from this



church, also from its weakness and guilt as church of the people, which must be borne in common solidarity. The obligation of the people's church has its only barrier in the irremovable responsibility for the purity of the preaching and of the confession' (p. 29). What this means is that the Church so long as it is orthodox in preaching and confession can conform as much to the world around as may be necessary to keep the people. As Germany has gone Nazi (this is the assumption), the Church should go Nazi too. Accordingly, the Church owes it to the State to rid itself of all liberalistic elements in its speech and action, political as well as theological. 'The pure preaching must affirm with all distinctness that Christ is not a religious hero, not a religious ideal, but the Saviour and the Lord. All else would be liberalistic self-sufficiency and a bad service to the State' (p. 31). This argument in my judgment comes perilously near the perversion of his teaching which Paul with horror condemns. 'Let us continue in sin that grace may abound' (Ro 6<sup>1</sup>). Because we are justified by faith, let us conform to the policy of the State without applying Christian moral standards to test whether it is right or wrong. To me it reads almost as blasphemy when the author writes that the national-socialist, who places 'we' above 'I' is a product of the Holy Spirit (see p. 34 f.). He is, however, convinced that fidelity to the gospel and service of the present State not only may, but must be, combined.

On the basis of so intimate a relation of evangelical faith and the national-socialist State the fifth chapter extends this service of the German State to the German individuals and communities outside of Germany. It is the task of the churches abroad to maintain the Germandom (no other word can express the meaning) of all Germans. That contention has a sinister aspect which the author does not recognize. Men of German descent in Canada or the United States must not become citizens in the country which gives them their livelihood. They must remain outposts of the German Reich, and, as that Reich is now, this consideration is disquieting. Bishop Heckel is quoted as saying: 'One does not rightly serve the people (*Volkstum*) if one does not always bring it back again into the Church of Christ, and one does not serve rightly the Church, if one does not always bring her into the striving in regard to the need, the guilt, and the formation of the people' (p. 42). The evangelical faith and German nationality are thus fused into one mass.

It is somewhat of a surprise to find that the

sixth chapter discusses the relation of the German Church to the Christian churches of the world. The common faith in the *una sancta ecclesia* imposes on each Church an ecumenic task. 'This ecumenic task of the Church has nothing to do with a washed-out, rootless internationalism, which is contrary to God's creation' (p. 43). Not only has the German Church this ecumenic task as a church, but 'she has her special ecumenic task, because she is the mother-church of the Reformation' (p. 44). Thus Protestant self-consciousness repudiates 'a humanitarian internationalism and a sentimental pacifism' (p. 45). It does not seem to occur to the writer that this nationalism may not rest wholly on God's creative order, but may be perverted by sin, and may be transcended in God's redemptive purpose in Christ. As a barrier against Bolshevism national-socialism has a lesson to teach to other nations. The final appeal is to Luther against the individualism, liberalism, internationalism, and pacifism which the author rejects, and to expose and condemn which appears to him to be the ecumenic task of the German Church. 'In any case Luther did not exactly make that a reproach to the State, that it preserves the life of the people by force. For Luther knew this, that the State needs force, to suppress the evil. Yes, there stands behind a conception of the State, which does not wish to know anything about force, at root a minimising of the harmful result of the Fall and the fact that we live in a fallen world' (p. 47).

Short as the pamphlet is, it deserves this fuller consideration, for it is ominous that such an ecclesiastical movement as the 'German Christians' should make its appeal to the Reformation, even to the Christian gospel against what the other churches regard as their progressive understanding of the mind of Christ and the purpose of God, and that a national policy which is a menace to world-peace should find, not its judge, but its advocate in the Christian Church as this party would fashion it. It is not in any controversial spirit, as I seek always to be animated by the spirit of reconciliation, that I have written this review, making explicit in plain English what might remain implicit in the obscure German, so as to expose clearly what this reactionary theology as a justification of a reactionary policy really is. For the other churches need to repent in so far as they have allowed their respective nations to treat the German nation as it has been treated by the victors, so that so morbid a mentality has been developed in a great nation as this apology for the

policy of the Church discloses. It is a service to our German brethren that they should see themselves as others see them, so that a genuine Christian understanding and fellowship may be soon restored.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

London.

Baethgen, over fifty years ago, declared that the phenomena of Semitic religion showed that originally there was no sex in the deity; in other words, that the deity was not thought of as primarily masculine or feminine. Professor Bertholet's range covers the entire field of comparative religion, but his conclusion is practically the same. At the core of primitive religion lay the conception of a Power rather than of what moderns term a personality. Only when this Power came to be endowed with qualities of will and purpose did the conception of sex enter into the idea. And even then the deity was regarded as feminine not less often than masculine; there were Mother deities as well as Father deities, even androgynous deities. The present monograph<sup>1</sup> is an outline of the subject, illustrated from various religions, the data being accompanied by suggestions as to the rationale of the practice. It is pointed out, for example, that sometimes the use of Nature determines the choice of sex; as in the case of the Egyptians, when the term for 'earth' is masculine, and the term for 'heaven' feminine. Yet in one religion hill or mountain deities are feminine, in another masculine. The Hebrew faith abjured female deities, and Yahweh was a Father invariably—'father' indicating authority rather than generation. But commonly the sex-definition was much more elastic. The possible reasons for all this, sociological, psychological, and cosmic, are indicated in Professor Bertholet's fascinating paper.

Four studies and notes of four books on the same subject make up the second *Heft* of this excellent magazine.<sup>2</sup> The subject is the modern German stress on nationalism as it is worked out by some enthusiasts with relation to historical Christianity. While the essays are written by Germans for Germans, they give an outsider some insight into the tension of the present situation. It would appear that in some quarters the view prevails that as Hellenism once shaped primitive Christianity,

so Germanism to-day may be expected to present essential Christianity in a fresh, vital form. What the Greeks once did to or for the gospel, why should not the Germans do to-day? It is against this exaggerated confidence that Professor Heussi writes his paper on the Germanizing of Christianity (pp. 119-145), a paper which for outsiders at any rate has more weight and interest than any others of the collection. Nothing more sympathetic and incisive could be penned upon the subject. It concludes by pointing out that even treasured writers like Heliand and Meister Eckhart thought and wrote of Christianity as true Germans, but that they never altered the substance of the Christian faith. As the other writers more or less cogently urge, a nation may have its special contribution to make to the Christianity which it inherits and which it shares with other nations, but no nation at present dare claim the right to re-cast the faith in a special mould of the twentieth century. The other papers are by Professor Dedo Müller, Dr. H. E. Eisenhuth (on Paul de Lagarde's idea of a national church), and Hans Weichelt. From them and from the books which are briefly reviewed at the close of the *Heft*, it is plain that a number of Nazi supporters in the camp of theology and philosophy are making play with the services of the German mystics. But the movement has wider ramifications, and the varied angles presented by this *Heft* will do something to make foreigners realize the wholesome no less than the risky features of the contemporary ferment.

JAMES MOFFATT.

New York.

Rudolf Otto, who is so well known to British readers as the author of 'The Idea of the Holy,' has just published a most important book, *Reich Gottes und Menschensohn*,<sup>3</sup> which treats a number of themes of first-class significance, including the Kingdom of God, the Son of Man, the Last Supper, and the charismatic element in the work and teaching of Jesus. The method adopted brings home the mutual relations of these themes, and the discussion leaves upon the mind a strong sense of their essential unity. As one would expect in a work from Otto's pen, Comparative Religion is frequently drawn upon to illustrate these conceptions. Otto, for example, is convinced that there are features in the teaching of Jesus about the Kingdom which ultimately are of Indian and Persian origin, and which came to Him through

<sup>1</sup> *Das Geschlecht der Gottheit*, by D. Alfred Bertholet. (Mohr, Tübingen; M.1.50.)

<sup>2</sup> *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1934, Heft 2. (Mohr, Tübingen.)

<sup>3</sup> Beck, Munich; Rm.12.50.



Apocalyptic and, in particular, through the Book of Enoch. At the same time he does full justice to the Jewish and Old Testament elements in His teaching. An extremely welcome note in the treatment is the reconciliation which is effected between the extreme eschatological position of Schweitzer and the non-eschatological Sayings. Otto recognizes that for Jesus the Kingdom belongs to the End-Time which follows on the Messianic Woes and the Judgment, but he also emphasizes the fact that Jesus Himself already lives in the wonder of the End-Time which for Him is active here and now, existing and growing around Himself. While Otto is not willing to render βασιλεία by 'Sovereignty' instead of 'Kingdom,' he thinks that it is better to speak of it as 'the range' or 'sphere of (the Divine) Sovereignty' (*Königsherrschaftsbereich*), and it is noteworthy that he leaves room for the idea that, in one of its aspects, the Kingdom includes the concept of a 'righteousness which is better than that of the Pharisees.'

Between Otto's account of the Kingdom and his exposition of the title 'Son of Man' there is the closest connexion. He holds that Jesus looked upon Himself as the Messiah-to-be, although at the same time He thought of His work, and especially His Suffering, as Messianic. In this conception, he believes, Jesus was influenced by the fact that, in the Book of Enoch (71<sup>14</sup>) Enoch himself is described as the Son of Man after his translation, and so is exalted to become the One he has proclaimed. This view is undoubtedly interesting, but it is not easy to believe that it was the writer's intention to describe Enoch as the Son of Man; and accordingly there is good reason to think that R. H. Charles was right in maintaining that the original reading of 71<sup>14</sup> was 'This is the Son of Man' (and not 'Thou art'). Otto well maintains that Jesus did not think of His death as that of a private person, but as that of the Messiah designate. 'As one who claims Messiahship He comes to be crucified, and without a Messianic claim is the crucifixion of Christ meaningless' (p. 189). Full justice is done to the unique element in this conception and to the synthesis which Jesus effected between the idea of the Son of Man and that of the Suffering Servant of Is 53. It is probable that the philologists will have a good deal to say in condemnation of Otto's equation (cf. Mk 10<sup>45</sup>) λύτρον = *kopher*, on the ground that while λύτρον is used six times in the LXX as the rendering of *kopher*, it is not used in cases where the sacrificial system or redemption from *sin* is in question. It is true that in the LXX *kipper* is translated by ἱλάσκειμαι, and not by λυτρόομαι; but

the weakness of these linguistic discussions is that we know nothing of the skill, or want of skill, of the translator who supplied λύτρον in Mk 10<sup>45</sup>. It is surprising that Otto should so confidently equate λύτρον and *kopher*, but it is to be hoped that discussions of this important point will not be allowed to obscure the strong case he has built up for the view that, influenced by the idea of the Suffering Servant (cf. Mk 9<sup>12</sup> and similar passages), Jesus thought of His Messianic Sufferings as the offering of His life on behalf of the 'many.'

Perhaps the most interesting part of Otto's work is the connexion he seeks to establish between the Messianic task of Jesus and the Last Supper. This he interprets as the consecration of the disciples for entrance into the inheritance of the Kingdom of God. He attaches special value to the Lukan account of the Supper, the original form of which he finds in Lk 22<sup>14-20a</sup>, 29f. and he takes the meaning of the story to be that Jesus appoints to His disciples the Kingdom as an inheritance because He is taking on Himself the Suffering of Death. The breaking of bread is an acted prophecy: 'As it happens to this bread, so it is happening to me'; and the eating which follows is an 'effective representation' of an act of sharing in the redemptive power of His Messianic Suffering (cf. pp. 257, 261). Otto does not doubt the connexion of the rite and of the Death with the forgiveness of sins, but maintains that forgiveness and atonement are not the purpose, but the means to the fulfilment of the Messianic End-Time; and he quotes with approval Luther's words: 'I believe that Jesus Christ has redeemed me from all sin through His innocent Suffering and Death, in order that I may live under Him and serve Him in His Kingdom.' This emphasis on the idea of the Kingdom, so manifest in the Lukan account of the Supper, gives place in Matthew to a representation more in accordance with later ecclesiastical beliefs in which the thought of the forgiveness of sins becomes more prominent.

I have left myself no space to treat the fourth section in which Otto discusses the charismatic element in the work and teaching of Jesus, but enough, I hope, has been said to show what an interesting and stimulating book this is. It is to be hoped that like his 'Das Heilige' this new work will find a translator, for of its importance both for New Testament criticism and for theology there can be no manner of doubt.

VINCENT TAYLOR.

Leeds.

An instructive lecture<sup>1</sup> on *The Religious Situation in South-East Europe*, by Dr. Friedrich Müller, quotes with approval the judgment of Dr. Zankow, the well-known Professor of Ecclesiastical Law in the University of Sofia: 'the consequences of the great war and of the Russian revolution have brought about external and internal changes in the Orthodox churches, the significance and extent of which surpass all similar changes hitherto. They are comparable with those which, in the Orthodox lands of South and East Europe, resulted from the invasions and conquests of Islam.'

Amongst the external changes the development of the presbyterial-synodal system is held to be especially noteworthy; details are given of recent regulations in Roumania, Bulgaria, and Jugoslavia. 'Even in Greece there has been release from the fetters of the State and recognition, to a considerable extent, of the autonomy of the Church.' These changes have aroused in some minds suspicions of the influence of the Churches of the Reformation, and fears lest the faith of the Orthodox Church should be threatened. These fears, Dr. Müller regards as groundless and indicative of ignorance of the origin of the movement.

Internal changes are noted in the attitude of the Orthodox churches to Ecumenical questions. Some look to Russia and some to the Anglican Church. 'Most significant and indeed most important' for the future is a revival movement in the Orthodox Church in Roumania which is spreading 'with quite astonishing rapidity.' Pfarrer Trifa began what was at first a *Schriftenmission* by publishing two popular Sunday newspapers and afterwards numerous religious works. The membership of the Mission has risen from 5 to 70,000. Owing to Pfarrer Trifa's indisposition the leader has recently been Professor Seca of the Orthodox Academy in Hermannstadt. Three characteristics of the Mission are mentioned; loyalty to the Orthodox Church; social activity, including opposition to social evils; the promulgation of personal religion. To secure these ends use is made of public discussions, personal conversations, and prayer meetings; also the lack of congregational singing in public worship in the Orthodox Church has been supplied by hymns composed by professors and by peasants. A significant departure from the practice of the Old

Orthodox Church is the placing of the Bible in the hands of the people. Dr. Müller regards this Mission as symptomatic, and its success as a hopeful sign; it is evident that he expects it to spread beyond Roumania.

Herr Carl Pabst, in *Volkskirche und Freikirche*,<sup>2</sup> does not discuss the present-day conflict between the claims of the Reich Church and the Confessional Church; it is the post-war separation of Church and State in Germany which, in his view, calls for a reconsideration of the principles and organization of the Evangelical Church and its relation to the Free Churches. There is, however, a plain statement that Luther regards the members of the Government as included in the *Volkskirche* by virtue of their baptism and therefore in duty bound to serve its interests with all their powers. 'The government is not itself to regulate the affairs of the Church, but to make such regulation possible by using its influence to secure the summoning of an ecclesiastical council.'

The *Volkskirche* is defined as 'consisting of members born within it who have been received by the rite of Infant Baptism into the ecclesiastical community.' The *Freikirche* is 'a voluntary Church which exists by the side of, or within, the national Church . . . a personal decision is essential to membership.' [Pabst seems to be unaware that there are Free Churches in which infants are admitted to the Sacrament of Baptism.] Troeltsch recognizes two types of churches—Institutional (*Anstaltskirchen*) and Sects; but his assertion that the two sociological types may be traced to the teaching of Jesus and are to be found in the Early Church is rejected. Disagreement is also expressed with Holl's statement that in Luther's teaching the basal principles both of the *Volkskirche* and the *Freiwilligkeitskirche* are present, 'the *Volkskirche* in its conviction of the victorious might of the Word; the *Freikirche* in its requirement of individual conscientious conviction.'

Herr Pabst is an exponent of the objective conception of the Church; there is no room in his theory for a sentence cited from Holl: 'Holiness lies not in the institution but in individuals.'

J. G. TASKER.

Tunbridge Wells.

<sup>1</sup> *Die religiöse Lage in Südosteuropa*: Vortrag bei der zweiten ökumenischen Hochschultagung der Luther-Akademie, von D. Friedrich Müller, Bischofsvikar, Hermannstadt (Bertelsmann, Gütersloh; R.M.o.80).

<sup>2</sup> *Volkskirche und Freikirche*: eine theologische Besinnung über Wesen und Form evangelischer Kirche als Beitrag zum Neubau der Kirche (Bertelsmann, Gütersloh; R.M.3.)



## Contributions and Comments.

### The Word רָבַע in Numbers xliii. 10.

IN THE EXPOSITORY TIMES for August 1934, p. 524, the Chief Rabbi draws attention to the translation of רָבַע in this verse. The parallelism demands for it the meaning 'ashes, dust,' and for this meaning the Chief Rabbi finds evidence in the Samaritan Targum on Gn 18<sup>27</sup>. May I supplement this evidence? According to Freytag (*Lex. Arab.-Lat.* ii. p. 115), *rab'* (dotted 'ayin) means *pulvis tenuissimus*. If רָבַע be equated with this Arabic word—and there seems to be no reason why it should not be—the Chief Rabbi's translation of it in this verse is rendered the more probable. The Septuagint, in translating by δῆμος (the Pesh. on the contrary by rūb'ā), clearly did not connect it in any way with רָבַע or רָבַע, 'fourth part'—rather did they guess at the meaning of a very rare word.

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### The Chester Beatty Papyri.

IN THE EXPOSITORY TIMES for November 1933 the Rev. C. A. Phillips of Bournemouth dealt with the recently discovered Chester Beatty Papyri from an expert critical point of view. But their romantic interest is even greater. These precious scraps of papyrus come to us from the ages of persecution. Torn almost to shreds, worn almost beyond handling, tattered sometimes beyond recognition, their omissions and *lacunæ* come to us as the wounds of the martyrs.

The great codices on which modern editions of the New Testament are founded (Vaticanus, Sinaiticus, Alexandrinus, and the rest) are noble volumes written on vellum, intended for the services of the great churches that were built after Christianity had become the religion of the Empire—the work of the greatest scholars and ablest calligraphers of the age. But these new-found codices are a century older. They are certainly older than the persecution of Diocletian (A.D. 303) and probably older than the Decian persecution (A.D. 250). They must have been held at times by men who could only hold them in peril of their lives.

In these persecutions every effort was made to destroy the books and documents of the Church. Diocletian was an unwilling persecutor, for his wife and daughter were Christians. But he was

terribly efficient in his war on the written word. Doubtless the best MSS, and certainly the copies used in public worship, were well known: and being known, could be confiscated and destroyed. Indeed there were weak brethren, '*Traditores*,' who without renouncing their faith, were willing to compromise with the Law by the surrender of forbidden books. So when we look on these papyri, or strain our eyes to read the text, we should remember that their very blemishes make them doubly precious to us.

Sometimes the omission is tantalizing beyond words. One instance occurs at St. Lk 11<sup>2</sup>. We want to know the earliest version of the Lord's Prayer. And this part of St. Luke is among the fragments preserved. We can trace (with difficulty) the Disciples' request, 'Teach us to pray.' And then seven lines are missing, and the Prayer is lost!

The unique claim made for Codex B must now disappear. We can no longer call the text of B a 'Neutral' Text in the sense of being free from editorial revision. No text bears the mark of careful and learned editorship and revision more clearly than that of Codex B. It is evident that when the fires of persecution had died out, the Church collected its scattered remains of ancient and perishing documents, in order to furnish new Scriptures for public use. Codex B may be regarded as the best of these: but it is certainly not 'Neutral.' Its position is rather that of a First Folio Shakespeare; the standard for subsequent editions, but itself subject to comparison (and sometimes unfavourable comparison) with other ancient and even older authorities.

The text of these Chester Beatty Papyri may be called an 'Origenian' text, representing a text probably predominating in Egypt in the early part of the third century. Over that text the writer's Guardian Angel must have watched with unremitting care. Before we can handle it, men must have risked or given their lives, to save it from destruction.

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### שָׁבַע = 'Fortune': A Reply.

In your August issue, Mr. T. H. Gaster challenges my translation of the Samaritan Targum of Gn 30<sup>13</sup>.



He denies that שבע means 'fortune,' and declares it to be 'merely the Samaritan way of writing שבח (praise). But the latter root occurs no less than fifteen times in that Targum—Gn 12<sup>15</sup> (ושבח) 49<sup>4</sup>, Ex 15<sup>1</sup> (תשבחה), 15<sup>2</sup>. 11. 13. 21, Lv 19<sup>24</sup>, Nu 23<sup>10</sup> (משבחים), Dt 10<sup>21</sup> 26<sup>19</sup> 32<sup>4</sup>—and in each case it is written with a ך and not with an ן. Moreover, this reading is constantly found in

the later literature; see, e.g. Cowley's *Samaritan Liturgy*.

Mr. Gaster's contention is thus not borne out by the linguistic facts, and cannot, therefore, affect my explanation of Gn 26<sup>34</sup>, of Beersheba as 'Fortune's Well,' and of Bathsheba as 'Fortunata.'

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## Entre Nous.

### Church Architecture.

Architecture, demonstrated to be indeed the most reflective of the arts, whose development was determined by need and whose meaning is not to be found in a sentimental symbolism but in the beliefs and practices of the various branches of the Christian Church, is the subject of a masterly survey—*The Church Architecture of Protestantism*—by the Rev. Andrew Landale Drummond, B.D., Ph.D., S.T.M. (T. & T. Clark; 15s. net).

Dr. Drummond is not a mere antiquarian, nor is he just an architect. He is a psychologist. Therein lies the secret of his book, for the psychologist understands; he gets below the surface and sees the hidden meanings. He points out that Gothic architecture, traditionally ecclesiastical, is not just an artistic presentation of pointed arches; it reflects a faith. The motive which animated the Gothic builders was belief in the efficacy of the Mass, and when the Law of England forbade the saying of Masses for the hastening of souls through Purgatory, and when the altar endowments were confiscated, and when the Bible was restored to the people and the preaching of the Word became as important as sacramental worship, then church architecture also went through its phase of reformation. No longer was there need for veiling the mysteries of the altar with enriched screenwork; no longer was there a demand for innumerable side chapels with their private altars; gone was the urge which led men to elaborate their churches with clustered columns and mysterious arcades. Priestly claims were overthrown. People came to church not only to bow before God but to hear the gospel preached. An *auditorium* was now wanted, and in the opinion of Nonconformists was of far greater importance than the chancel.

Synchronous with the Reformation, and indeed part of it, was the Classic Renaissance. The new

architecture seemed more in keeping with the new spirit. Even the Church of England, with her strong grip on traditionalism, was swept along in the new flood, and Wren and his followers cast off the Gothic mode, and not only built in a new style but remodelled many a Gothic building in a mixture as impossible as that of oil and water.

Then came the Gothic revival and the Oxford Movement. The former affected all Protestantism, the latter only Anglicanism. Both had their effect on church architecture. But the Gothic spirit was dead and the new buildings were but dry bones. Nonconformists at once found themselves in difficulty. 'They could not dispense with galleries and a central pulpit, or successfully elongate their chapels into any semblance of mediæval form. All they could do was to point their windows, attach pinnacles and battlements to the exterior and insert Gothic tracery in the panels of pulpit and gallery. Nonconformity had its great preachers, but few ministers and educated laymen who took the slightest interest in problems of public worship and chapel architecture. Great preachers have seldom been patient with liturgical forms—in their fear of anything which might make Personality less central.' Notice the psychological touch. 'But,' continues Dr. Drummond, 'in the average congregation, ministers and educated laymen are increasingly conscious of the deadening effect of worshipping in pretentious, inartistic, and often drab sanctuaries.' Elsewhere he speaks of 'the morose dryness of Protestantism.' 'A Christian symbol,' he says, 'such as the cross (at the heart of Evangelical Theology and Hymnology), is still widely objected to, inside a church if not outside; while machinery, for example, organ pipes, symbolic only of human ingenuity, is not only accepted but often heedlessly obtruded.' 'Here, surely, is something on which Protestant thought should clarify



itself if it is to keep hold of the people in this age.'

Of particular interest is Dr. Drummond's chapter on the bearing of psychology on church architecture. Here he touches a little-explored field. Protestants and Romanists have erred in building churches that were unrelated to the homes of the people. 'Nothing could be more dismal than the average Protestant Gothic Revival Church, with its bare strip of gravel or cement, closed doors, and high railings; at much less expense a simple church surrounded by trees and grass could have been built, with the particular environment in view.' The architect who thinks merely in terms of 'styles' is in large measure responsible for the deadness of so many of our nineteenth-century churches. Canon Streeter says he has only seen one modern church which appeared to him to embody adequately *the ideal of a living community*. 'Religion is concerned with Unseen Realities, but there are temporal gateways through which the wayfarer must be guided if he is become aware of the spiritual world. Obscure and unimpressive church buildings may shelter a corporate spiritual life that runs deep along the narrow channels of congregational activity, but the swift and unending stream of modern life sweeps by without taking any notice.'

The whole work runs to three hundred and forty-two pages, every one of which is packed with good things. The arrangement of the material is chronological and church architecture is treated in historical perspective. It is profusely illustrated with excellent half-tone blocks, and though the British reader will at first be disappointed at the number of foreign examples of church building, his second reaction will be that a far wider view of the subject is obtained just because of that. The photographs are also concisely grouped in a systematic plan. Dr. Drummond has a clear mind; he organizes his material well and interestingly so that his book not only makes good reading but is also encyclopædic. We would commend it earnestly to all who are contemplating building a new church.

#### Berdyayev.

Amidst the vast mass of literature about Russia to-day the writings of Nicolas Berdyayev should not be overlooked. It is now over a year since the first impression of *The End of our Time* was published by Messrs. Sheed & Ward, but those who missed this little volume would do well to read it now along with the author's important new book on Dostoevsky, of whom Berdyayev says that 'he has played a decisive part in my spiritual life.'

Berdyayev's own life—he is now in his early sixties—has been a stormy one, and his faith tested by fire. Before the Revolution he was exiled to North Russia, afterwards he was appointed Professor of Philosophy in Moscow University, but was exiled again in 1922 because his philosophy was a Christian one. He is now Principal of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion in Paris, and Editor of *Putj* ('The Way').

*The End of our Time* is most valuable for its daring and challenging analysis of democracy. Democracy he sees to be rooted in the Humanist system, innocent and good to another age, but 'Where there is no God there is no man: that is what we have learned from experience.' This humanism he sees as a kind of impossible religious neutrality which in our times can no longer be tolerated. To-day, clearer than ever before, stand the opposing forces of Christ and Antichrist, of God and Satan. 'The falling to pieces of the humanist "middle-way" lay-state, the emergence everywhere of opposed principles as far apart as the poles, clearly mark the end of the modern non-religious age and the beginning of a religious one, of a new medieval period.' This new age of darkness Berdyayev does not envisage as one of confusion and tragedy so much as of gestation, of the unveiling of deeper and more secret mysteries of being, a kind of universal Dark Night of the Soul, which must precede a higher order of life.

Since the Renaissance we have been seeking salvation through individualism in many forms. Now man 'moves towards generality, an epoch of universality and collectivity. He no longer believes that he was self-sufficient and could look after himself from the moment he had rationalist thought, lay morality, Law, Liberalism, Democracy, and Parliaments. Too many things testify to the contrary.'

In short, this prophet finds all modern lay thought to be built on the hypothesis that Truth is unknowable, and that it may not exist. Democracy is 'the assertion of a right to error and falsehood, a giving-over of the decision of truth to the votes of a majority.' If a man cannot discover the true God he will give his allegiance to something of his own making. This is the bondage of modern life. That it is a bondage is proved when we become conscious that government must be founded not merely on juridical laws, but on socio-biological laws. We see this consciousness already awakening both in Fascism and in Communism, in all spontaneous groupings which are superseding judicial systems, and organizing authority more or less freely. These people do not wish to keep the Law, but to keep



themselves alive, to find by fair means or foul, in face of the malignant endlessness of a capitalist world, their own souls. Mankind is out now for 'a much more simple and elementary material culture, and a spiritual culture that is far more complex.' That is what the world will seek in the dark night which it is about to enter now, and he that seeketh shall find.

#### Vision of God.

'The medieval times were truly and eminently religious, they were carried along by a longing for the vision of God which brought the people to the verge of a holy madness; their whole culture was directed towards that which is Transcendent and "beyond," they owed their scholasticism and mysticism . . . to a high tension of the spirit to which modern history has no equivalent.'<sup>1</sup>

#### 2 Co. v. 16.

'Does Paul here deny that he had known Jesus in the days of his flesh, or does he indicate that he had known him? That he denies it and even manifests indifference to the Jesus of history has long been the prevailing opinion, one which largely accounts for the depreciation of Paul as an authority concerning Jesus. But this interpretation is almost certainly wrong. It is now widely agreed that he claims to have known Jesus in the days of his flesh, though only to waive that claim in favour of his deeper knowledge of the risen Christ. That Paul had seen Jesus, had probably-heard him (possibly on the occasion of his Trial), and may even have been a spectator of the Crucifixion, is the view now taken by several first-rate scholars (Feine, Weiss, Loofs: see *Living Issues in the New Testament*, ch. i.).<sup>2</sup>

#### Grace.

'This word, which plays so large a part in Paul's thought and diction, has suffered sadly through having become a kind of counter in the theological controversy. Primarily, grace like graciousness is a quality of character, but a quality which does not stop short at the person who has it. To borrow a word from modern science, grace is essentially radio-active. It implies moral radiation. The grace of God or of Christ is the goodness of God or of Christ as it enters into the experience of men. As it radiates from God it is free and unconditioned. As it reaches man it is conditioned by his capacity to receive it or by his need at the moment. There are

not different kinds of grace: it is always the same. But as it is experienced by man it is differentiated by the form of need which it meets, or the form of energy which it releases in him (e.g. authority, "grace of apostleship") (Ro. xii. 3). Grace is God giving Himself in Christ. Faith is man accepting the gift.'<sup>3</sup>

#### Elizabeth Paul.

Twenty-eight poems by Elizabeth Paul, making a thin but attractive volume in its buff binding, has been published by Messrs. Basil Blackwell, Oxford (*Fragments and Fancies*; 3s. net). Elizabeth Paul has a spirit delicately attuned to Nature and beauty. In 'Possession' she sings:

I take my way among the haunts of men  
With a fire in my bosom—a self-consuming fire,  
A dumbly-smouldering fire, so that no rest  
Is possible for me by day or night.  
But when some fount of beauty is unsealed  
Before my ravished eyes, O then my soul  
Goes down before the soul of Nature: then  
Awhile the pain has respite: fortified  
With vision, and refreshed with inner joy,  
I feel myself on mounting tides upborne  
Into a place of wealth where all is mine—  
And in that moment I possess the world.

For a deeper note see 'Fear not to Love':

Fear not to love thy neighbour overmuch—  
'Tis God thou lovest in him—God, who lives  
In every lovely thing and thought on earth.  
Nature's delight and man's nobility,  
He uses them to show us what He is.  
That which is perfect we most justly call  
Divine: our excellences are but gleams  
From His unstinted, life-bestowing light.  
He sits not throned in starry distances,  
Judging the world, counting His tale of praise:  
Nay—lest perchance it should not have sufficed  
To show Himself in images alone  
Of love—His Son, to bind humanity  
Yet closer to Him, plunged into the flood  
And bitter tide of man's experience,  
Enduring that which wrung the human cry  
'Let this cup pass!' O never say that God  
Is far from man who has no life but His.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 178.

<sup>1</sup> Nicolas Berdyaev, *The End of our Time*.

<sup>2</sup> C. Anderson Scott, *Footnotes to St. Paul*, 142 f.